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Abstract 
Negotiations on the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) are al-
ways lengthy, complex and conflictual. This applies to the MFF 2021–2027, 
which is expected to have a financial volume of around €1.3 trillion. As 
usual, the negotiations revolve around political priorities, the expenditures 
determined for each of them, and the distribution of the financial burden 
among member states. This ongoing process is hampered by the forthcoming 
Brexit, as the UK has so far contributed substantial amounts to the Union’s 
budget. Furthermore, there are new tasks for the EU which require additional 
resources, such as the establishment of a defence union, increased protec-
tion of the EU’s external borders, and the stabilisation of the euro zone. 
Since the European Commission presented its proposal for a pragmatic 
reform of the EU budget on 2 May 2018, the member states have been nego-
tiating a comprehensive package. However, cohesion in the coalitions of net 
contributors and net recipients is dwindling. The delicate negotiation frame-
work makes the course and results of the search for consensus more difficult 
to foresee, and the actors less predictable. Due to the increasing uncertainty, 
all participants expect Germany to play a balancing role. Many countries 
hope that Germany, as the strongest economy and the largest net contribu-
tor, will provide additional resources to facilitate a successful conclusion of 
the negotiations on a new MFF. The German government therefore needs 
clear and firm ideas about the fields in which it wants to modernise EU pol-
icies and to further Europeanise and communitise them. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
A New Budget for the EU. Negotiations 
on the Multiannual Financial Framework 
2021–2027 
Negotiations on the EU’s Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) are often as lengthy, complex and 
conflictual as those aimed at modifying the European 
Treaties. The new financial framework 2021–2027 
will determine the priorities of European policy over 
the next seven years and therefore the ability of 
EU-27 to act. These already complex negotiations 
will be further complicated by the imminent depar-
ture of the large contributor United Kingdom (UK). 
At the same time, in their New Strategic Agenda 
2019–2024, the European heads of state and govern-
ment have given the EU new, additional tasks such as 
external border protection, strengthening the social 
dimension of the integration process, and stabilising 
the European Economic and Monetary Union. With 
these new tasks, the need for funding is also likely to 
increase. Conflicts over the distribution of EU funds 
have therefore become much more acute. 
Since the European Commission presented its pro-
posal for a pragmatic reform to modernise the EU 
budget on 2 May 2018, the member states have been 
negotiating this comprehensive package. The pro-
cedure usually follows a well-known script with a 
fixed distribution of roles, the traditional conflict 
between net contributors and net recipients, and a 
well-rehearsed drama to reaching a consensus. Not 
only thanks to Brexit and the changed international 
framework conditions, but also due to the changing 
structures of the negotiation process and the coa-
litions among member states, a tricky situation is 
emerging. The course and results of the negotiations 
are becoming more difficult to predict and the actors 
less predictable. This increases uncertainty amongst 
all participants, but also creates leeway for negotia-
tions and new reform options. 
It will therefore be important for negotiations by 
the German Federal Government to strike a balance 
between appropriate reform and modernisation steps 
on the one hand, and political pragmatism and real-
ism on the other. Germany’s MFF policy should there-
fore be geared towards stabilising and keeping the 
EU-27 together, while also modernising it at the same 
time. 
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It is laudable that the German government is 
prepared to pay more into the EU budget for these 
long-term European policy goals. In doing so, how-
ever, it must take into account the special rules and 
tactical specifics of the MFF negotiations. When it 
comes to Germany’s additional financial contribu-
tions, it is especially a question of the right timing 
and the appropriate conditions. This needs to happen 
no later than when the decisive negotiations are held 
in the European Council and overall political solu-
tions have to be found. Then, many member states 
will be expected to formulate their special requests 
and agree exceptions beyond their current familiar 
positions, and will make their approval of the over-
all MFF compromise dependent on this. In the final 
phase of the negotiations, the German Government 
will have to limit the financial and substantive scope 
of other member states’ wish lists and tie them to its 
own objectives. 
It will be crucial to prevent system failure as well 
as permanent exceptions and special services. The 
European partners will present their requests and 
hope that Germany, as the strongest economy and 
largest net contributor, will provide the additional 
resources required for a consensus. By then, the Ger-
man government will need clear and firm ideas on 
the areas in which it wants to modernise EU policies 
and continue to Europeanise and communitise. The 
narrow focus of many member states on pure figures 
as well as on the change in their respective national 
net balance could be the starting point for politically 
substantive reforms. This does not mean pushing for 
a fundamental fiscal reform that would redistribute 
financial tasks at the political decision-making levels. 
Instead, the aim should be to reorient the content 
of policy objectives and tasks within the existing EU 
spending policies. Money from the EU budget should 
only be spent on achieving common (and commonly 
agreed) policy objectives. 
At the same time, however, German negotiating 
tactics should be sufficiently flexible to be able to 
balance the distribution conflicts that will inevitably 
arise. The initial basis for this is its willingness to 
make greater contributions to the modernisation and 
Europeanisation of European policies. It perpetuates 
the German EU policy of linking the promise of 
higher German payments to the further development 
and consolidation of the integration process in the 
common interest. Currently, the European project 
could consist of strengthening and expanding the 
autonomy and political capacity of the EU to act in 
budgetary terms. This certainly includes the first ten-
tative steps proposed by the European Commission 
to create a European security union with strong joint 
protection of common external borders and a genuine 
European defence union. Those using the MFF nego-
tiations to deepen and consolidate the EU will prob-
ably not be primarily other member states, but rather 
the Community institutions and above all the Euro-
pean Commission. 
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Public budgets are predictions for future challenges 
and demands as well as numerical definitions of po-
litical priorities and goals. “A budget, therefore, may 
also be characterized as a series of goals with price 
tags attached.”1 Negotiations on public budgets are 
always difficult because political priorities have to be 
defined and distribution conflicts settled. In the MFF 
negotiations, decisions are made not only on an an-
nual budget, but also on political and fiscal priorities 
for the next seven years. Furthermore, a consensus 
must be reached between 27 equal actors, which 
then needs parliamentary approval. In view of these 
requirements, it is not surprising how complicated 
the European negotiations on the EU’s next financial 
framework are. In addition, the United Kingdom, 
which has so far contributed substantial amounts to 
the EU budget, will leave the Union. Brexit will there-
fore have an impact on future financing and the ex-
penditure side of the EU budget, and on the distribu-
tion of contribution burdens. 
The MFF deals with a financial volume of around 
€1.3 trillion, and how this huge sum will be spent in 
the next decade. The negotiations therefore revolve 
around financial possibilities and burdens as well as 
their distribution among the member states. Other 
topics include the priorities of European policy, and 
the scope for policy-making, and the autonomy of 
the EU and its institutions. 
The MFF 2014–2020 will expire on 31 December 
2020. If the EU does not find consensus on a new 
financial framework, it will inevitably slide into a 
crisis. Article 312(4) TFEU stipulates that the ceilings 
for the MFF headings for 2020 would remain valid. 
However, the legal basis of the expenditure pro-
grammes would be missing in specific policy areas of 
the EU. The EU would therefore not be able to finance 
new programmes, as the legal acts for the current 
programmes limit their duration until 31 December 
2020. Only direct payments to European farmers 
would not be affected, as the legal acts for the first 
 
1 Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi Caiden, New Politics of the 
Budgetary Process, 4. ed. (New York, 2001), 1f. 
pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) do not 
include a limitation on their duration. It would, how-
ever, reinforce the sense of crisis in this scenario if 
only agricultural businesses in the EU did not have to 
fear direct and immediate losses, wheras European 
innovation and research policy support would be dis-
continued. All stakeholders therefore agree that such 
a development should be avoided. They have a com-
mon interest in adopting all legal bases for the MFF 
and the EU sector policies at an early stage. 
Nevertheless, there are different, sometimes con-
flicting ideas about the scope and objectives of the 
adjustments to the MFF and the EU budget policy. 
External observers regularly call for fundamental 
reforms to both the expenditure and revenue sides 
of the EU budget. Conversely, the actors involved 
repeatedly point out that compromises are extremely 
difficult to negotiate, rendering far-reaching reforms 
impossible. Moreover, the current environment 
makes negotiations more difficult. With Brexit, and 
thus the withdrawal of a large contributor, the dis-
tribution struggles within the EU-27 are even fiercer. 
At the same time, there is increasing uncertainty 
about the course of the negotiation process and thus 
uncertainty among all actors. Yet the demands and 
challenges for the EU are growing. An important 
element of continuity and stability here is certainly 
Germany’s balancing role as the largest contributor 
and the strongest economy in the EU-27. Germany 
thus faces correspondingly high expectations. 
Introduction 
The European Commission’s Proposal 
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The official negotiation process on the MFF 2021–
2027 began when Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker and Budget Commissioner Günther Oettinger 
presented the European Commission’s proposals “for 
a pragmatic, modern and long-term budget” to the 
European Parliament (EP) on 2 May 2018.2 This com-
prehensive MFF package included a Communication 
with a comprehensive annex to the Commission’s 
ideas for a new financial framework, a working paper 
on the results of a wide-ranging expenditure and 
policy review, and regulation proposals for the new 
MFF after 2020 and on the reform of the own re-
sources system. By mid-June 2018, the Commission 
had successively supplemented its initial reflections 
with 37 legislative proposals and accompanying work-
ing papers on all sector policies affecting expenditure.3 
With this “strategic concept” for modernising the EU 
budget, the Commission attempted to balance the 
conflicting interests among member states and also 
between the EU institutions. It called for a modern, 
more flexible and focused financial framework guided 
by the principles of prosperity, sustainability, soli-
darity and security. 
The Expenditure Side: 
Budget Volume and Priorities 
The MFF proposal provides for a total volume of com-
mitments of €1.279 trillion in current prices and 
€1.135 trillion in constant 2018 prices. This would 
 
2 European Commission, A Modern Budget for a Union That 
Protects, Empowers and Defends. The Multiannual Financial Frame-
work for 2021–2027, COM(2018) 321 final (Brussels, 2 May 
2018). 
3 For all legislative proposals, as well as the Commission’s 
communications and working papers see European Commis-
sion, EU Budget for the Future, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 
future-europe/eu-budget-future_en. 
represent 1.11 percent of the EU–27 Gross National 
Income (GNI) and an increase of around 18 percent 
compared to the current 2014–2020 financial frame-
work. In terms of payment appropriations, i.e. actual 
outflows, the new MFF would have a total volume of 
€1.104 trillion or 1.08 percent of GNI, an increase of 
more than 20 percent compared to the current MFF. 
Outside the financial framework, around €26 billion 
is to be added for special funds, such as an EU reserve 
for emergency aid, the European Solidarity Fund and 
the Globalisation Fund. What is new is that the Euro-
pean Development Fund (EDF), which was previously 
managed and financed outside the MFF, is to be in-
cluded in the financial framework and could thus 
further increase the total MFF volume. In total, the 
EU budget would amount to €1.160 trillion, equiva-
lent to 1.14 percent of GNI. The Commission thus 
positioned itself roughly in the middle of the range 
between 1.1 and 1.2 percent of GNI that was repeat-
edly mentioned by Commissioner Oettinger. 
The Commission abstains from 
formulating a target and regulatory 
idea for the new MFF. 
While the “Europe 2020”4 strategy was still the 
target and the regulatory framework for the current 
2014–2020 financial framework, the European Com-
mission is now abandoning such a target and regu-
latory idea for the new MFF. According to the Com-
mission, the MFF is oriented towards the agenda for 
the future of the EU-27, as decided by the European 
Council (EC) in Bratislava in 2016 and Rome in 2017, 
and is “tightly geared to the political priorities of the 
Union of 27”; it will be a budget “to deliver efficiently 
 
4 On the strategy “Europe 2020” see Peter Becker, “Inte-
gration ohne Plan – Die neue Wachstumsstrategie der EU 
‘Europe 2020’”, Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 21, no. 1 
(2011): 67–91. 
The European Commission’s 
Proposal 
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on the Union’s priorities”.5 In its proposals, the Com-
mission repeatedly stresses that the future MFF must 
contribute to implementing the EU’s political agenda 
for the future. 
The Commission wants to create a new structure 
for the financial framework by increasing the number 
of MFF headings from five to seven. The specific ex-
penditure programmes in the individual policy areas 
are to be allocated to these new headings and bundled 
into 17 “policy clusters”. These clusters range from 
research and development, internal market, space 
and migration to external relations, pre-accession 
aid and administrative expenditure. They should be 
flexibly combinable or interlinked. 
In the Commission’s view, the main task is to find 
a good balance between new and traditional spending 
priorities. Firstly, the political priorities arising from 
new challenges must be adequately funded. This con-
cerns migration and external border management; 
foreign, security and defence policy; and the pro-
motion of research, innovation and digitalisation. On 
the other hand, the financing of all these new tasks 
must be brought into line with the existing priorities 
of traditional policies, i.e. the CAP and cohesion 
policy. In addition, there must be a compensation for 
the UK’s contributions. In future, EU funding will be 
allocated in such a way that the CAP, cohesion policy 
and new priorities in internal research, security and 
foreign policy each account for around one third of 
total expenditure. Agricultural and cohesion policies 
will therefore remain priorities in the EU budget, but 
their share of the total will be gradually reduced. 
However, this is only reflected in relation to the total 
volume of the MFF, not in the nominal budget esti-
mates. For the CAP, the nominal estimates are to fall 
from about €410 billion for the MFF 2014–2020 to 
about €372 billion for the new MFF 2021–2027. How-
ever, if the current MFF estimates are reduced by the 
UK expenditure, the estimates will only shrink from 
around €383 billion to €372 billion. In European co-
hesion policy they are even to be slightly increased, 
from €269 billion for the EU-27 (excluding UK) in the 
current MFF to €273 billion in the future MFF. 
The biggest increase foreseen by the Commission 
for programmes is in the field of external border 
management and migration. The budget estimates for 
border management, migration and asylum are to be 
almost tripled to €33 billion. The funds for the Eras-
 
5 European Commission, A Modern Budget for a Union That 
Protects, Empowers and Defends (see note 2), 1–2. 
mus programme are to be doubled; considerably 
more money than before is also to be made available 
for digitalisation. In order to stabilise the euro zone, 
a reform aid programme totalling €25 billion is also 
to be set up in MFF heading 2 “Cohesion and Values” 
to help member states implement structural reforms. 
In addition, the Commission is planning a European 
Investment Stabilization Fund in order to support 
the investment volume in the affected countries with 
European money in times of crisis, and in the event 
of sharp slumps in growth. Loans to the member 
states are to be secured with a maximum of €30 bil-
lion from the EU budget. This investment fund could 
later be expanded with funds from the European Sta-
bility Mechanism and contributions from potential 
beneficiaries. 
To finance previous and future priorities, the Com-
mission advocates a combination of savings, redeploy-
ment and additional funding. Budget Commissioner 
Oettinger was quick to argue that new priorities should 
be financed mainly from new, additional budgetary 
resources and that the gap arising from Brexit could 
be half filled by savings and half by additional rev-
enues.6 With this linking of austerity measures and 
additional money, now known as the “Oettinger for-
mula”,7 the Commission wants to meet the conflict-
ing expectations and interests of member states. On 
the one hand, they demand far-reaching reforms to 
be initiated and new policies to be financed, but on 
the other hand they insist on perpetuating traditional 
policies unchanged, and are not prepared to increase 
the budget. 
According to the calculations of the German Minis-
try of Finance, this increase in the total MFF volume 
would mean a considerable increase of more than €15 
billion per year for the German contributions to the 
EU budget. Thus the gross payments from the federal 
budget would grow to an average of €45 billion per 
year.8 At the same time, the payments that flow back 
 
6 Ibid., 24. 
7 See also Günther Oettinger, “EU-Budget mit Europäi-
schem Mehrwert”, Speech at the Commission’s conference 
“Shaping our Future”, 8 January 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission/commissioners/2014-2019/oettinger/blog/eu-
budget-mit-europaischem-mehrwert-rede-auf-der-konferenz-
shaping-our-future-08012018_en. 
8 Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF), A Modern Budget for 
Europe, Monthly Report of the BMF (Berlin and Bonn, October 
2018), 8–14. 25 billion VAT and GNI-related own resource 
payments to the EU budget were reported in the German 
budget in the 2018 financial year. 
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 Table 1 
The European Commission’s Proposal 
Multiannual financial framework 2021–2027 (EU-27) 
Resources for commitments (EUR million, fixed prices 2018) 
 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027  Total 
Internal market, innovation and digitalisation 23,955 23,918 24,203 23,624 23,505 23,644 23,454 166,303 
Cohesion and values 
of which Cohesion 
51,444 
45,597 
54,171 
46,091 
56,062 
46,650 
56,600 
47,212 
57,148 
47,776 
59,200 
48,348 
57,349 
48,968 
391,974 
330,642 
Natural Resources and Environment 
of which market-related expenditure and direct payments 
50,323 
37,976 
49,580 
37,441 
48,886 
39,946 
48,097 
36,346 
47,326 
35,756 
46,575 
35,176 
45,836 
34,606 
336,623 
254,247 
Migration and border management 3,076 4,219 4,414 4,647 4,719 4,846 4,908 30,829 
Security and defence 3,154 3,229 3,183 3,281 3,517 3,743 4,216 24,323 
Neighbourhood and the world 14,765 14,831 15,002 15,290 15,711 16,298 17,032 108,929 
European public administration 
of which administrative expenses of the institutions 
10,388 
8,128 
10,518 
8,201 
10,705 
8,330 
10,864 
8,432 
10,910 
8,412 
11,052 
8,493 
11,165 
8,551 
75,602 
58,547 
Total resources for commitments 
as percentage of GNI 
157,105 
1.12% 
160,466 
1.13% 
162,455 
1.13% 
162,403 
1.12% 
162,836 
1.11% 
165,358 
1.11% 
163,960 
1.09% 
1,134,583 
1.11% 
Total resources for payments 
as percentage of GNI 
150,168 
1.07% 
151,482 
1.07% 
160,631 
1.12% 
160,631 
1.10% 
160,631 
1.09% 
160,631 
1.08% 
160,631 
1.07% 
1,104,805 
1.08% 
Available margin 
Own resources ceiling in percent of GNI 
(with the currently effective ceiling) 0,22% 0.22% 0.17% 0.19% 0.20% 0.21% 0.22% 0.21% 
Outside of the MFF ceiling 
Special Instruments         
Reserves for Emergency Aid 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 4,200 
European Globalisation Fund 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 1,400 
Solidarity Fund 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 4,200 
Flexibility Instrument 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 7,000 
European Investment Stabilisation Function to be decided to be decided to be decided to be decided to be decided to be decided to be decided to be decided 
European Peace Facility 753 970 1,177 1,376 1,567 1,707 1,673 9,223 
Outside of the MFF ceilings in total 3,153 3,370 3,577 3,776 3,967 4,107 4,073 26,023 
MFF + Total outside the MFF limits 
as percentage of GNI 
160,258 
1.14% 
163,836 
1.15% 
166,032 
1.16% 
166,179 
1.14% 
166,803 
1.13% 
169,465 
1.14% 
168,033 
1.11% 
1,160,606 
1.14% 
Source: European Commission, A Modern Budget for a Union That Protects, Empowers and Defends (see note 2). 
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to Germany from the EU budget would fall signifi-
cantly, by up to 20 percent in the area of structural 
funds. As a result, the negative German net balance 
would rise considerably. 
Budget Financing: New Sources, 
No Rebates 
As with expenditure, the EU budget must also be 
reformed on the revenue side, according to the Euro-
pean Commission. The basic requirement for the Own 
Resources system has always been to ensure sufficient 
and secure revenues to cover expenditure on a perma-
nent basis. In addition, the financing system should 
become simpler and more transparent and at the 
same time have a political steering effect. Therefore, 
“the Commission proposes to modernise and simplify 
the existing own resources system and to diversify the 
sources of revenue”.9 However, it does not propose a 
real EU tax and the fiscal sovereignty of the member 
states remains fully respected. “The EU does not have 
the power to levy taxes”, the Commission notes.10 
There will be a number of new 
sources of financing, but no EU tax. 
In order to improve funding, diversification of 
revenue, and autonomy of the EU, the Commission 
intends to introduce a number of new own resources. 
The revenue from the emissions trading system should 
be increased and contributions on the basis of non-
recyclable plastic waste11 should be paid to the EU. In 
addition, the profits of the European Central Bank – 
the so-called seigniorage that has been paid out to the 
national central banks to date – should in future be 
used to finance the investment stabilisation function 
in the euro zone. Contributions will also be envisaged 
on the basis of a consolidated corporate tax base that 
has not yet been agreed on or introduced.12 With this 
 
9 European Commission, A Modern Budget for a Union That 
Protects, Empowers and Defends (see note 2), 29. 
10 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on 
the System of Own Resources of the European Union, COM(2018) 
325 final (Brussels, 2 May 2018), 3. 
11 Each kilogram of non-recyclable plastic is subject to 
a levy, which is then paid by national budgets to the EU. 
According to the Commission’s proposal, the levy would 
be €0.8 per kilogram. 
12 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive 
on a Common Corporate Tax Base, COM(2016) 685 final (Brus-
proposal, the Commission is drawing on earlier con-
siderations on such a tax base. However, negotiations 
between member states concerning this idea have 
stalled and the chances of achieving an agreement 
are highly doubtful. Nevertheless, the Commission 
expects that with new sources of funding, the EU 
could raise around €22 billion per year for its budget. 
The Commission expects the proposed new own 
resources not only to generate revenue for the EU 
budget, but also to help the EU meet its climate 
change and sustainability policy objectives. 
The Commission also wants to reform the tradi-
tional source of own resources, the customs duties. 
The Commission argues that the flat rate of currently 
20 percent of the revenues granted as collection costs 
in favour of member states clearly exceeds the actual 
costs incurred. They seem to be a hidden form of con-
tribution correction or a de facto participation of 
member states in the customs revenues of the EU. That 
is why this flat rate should be reduced to 10 percent 
of revenue. The extremely complicated VAT-related 
own resource should also be revised. Discounts and 
special rules in the Own Resources system should be 
abolished, though not immediately and in one step, 
but gradually until the end of the MFF term. The aim 
is to convert “all corrections on the revenue side of 
the budget [...] into transparent lump sum payments 
per Member State” until “the national contributions 
(measured in percent of gross national income) reach 
a fair level comparable to other Member States not 
benefitting from a rebate”.13 
Difficult Evaluation with a New Point 
of Departure 
In order to evaluate the Commission’s proposal, all 
actors generally use the current financial framework 
as a benchmark. On the basis of the deviations from 
the MFF 2014–2020 budget estimates, i.e. increases 
 
sels, 25 October 2016) and European Commission, Proposal 
for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corpo-
rate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2016) 683 final (Brussels, 25 Oc-
tober 2016). 
13 European Commission, A Modern Budget for a Union that 
Protects, Empowers and Defends (see note 2), 27. The Commis-
sion is obviously thinking of a system of degressive flat rate 
payments in favour of Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark 
and the Netherlands until a target margin to finance the EU 
budget of around 0.6 percent of the respective national GNI 
of the member states is reached. 
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and cuts, the member states try to deliberate whether 
the Commission’s MFF proposal has set the right 
spending priorities for the next financial period that 
correspond to their own political priorities and 
national funding interests. This comparison is diffi-
cult, however, because the EU will shrink to 27 
member states as a result of Brexit and the bench-
mark will therefore change. If the current financial 
framework for the EU-28 is to be compared with the 
proposed MFF for an EU-27, expenditure for the UK 
must first be excluded and a “virtual” EU-27 financial 
framework 2014–2020 calculated. In addition, the 
comparison is made more difficult as the financial 
framework is given a new structure. Previously sepa-
rate expenditure programmes will be reorganised and 
bundled into more comprehensive new programmes. 
In addition, the European Development Fund, which 
was previously managed outside the MFF, shall be 
included in the financial framework. 
Considering these difficulties of comparison, it is 
not surprising that the Commission’s calculations of 
the volume of cuts and increases in expenditure have 
been questioned and heavily criticised. The Commis-
sion speaks of moderate cuts in agricultural policy 
of around five percent and in the Structural Funds of 
around seven percent. Depending on the calculation 
method and initial scale, the growth of new policy 
areas or savings in traditional policies may vary. 
Sometimes the nominal budget estimates are com-
pared, sometimes the proposals are also compared in 
constant prices, i.e. adjusted to inflation. Some actors 
relate the budget estimates to the GNI of the EU-27, 
while others show them as a proportion of the total 
budget. In order to calculate the cuts in CAP and 
Structural Funds, the Commission uses the final 
financial year (2020) of the current MFF as a bench-
mark – a financial year in which high payments 
are expected and scheduled at the end of the fund-
ing period – and multiplies the relevant figures 
by seven. On the other hand, the member states cal-
culate the average financial volume of the two policy 
areas over the entire funding period and thus come 
up with cuts of up to 30 percent in real terms for in-
dividual member states. In the case of the CAP, it is 
also significant that the Commission plans cuts that 
are mainly in the second pillar, i.e. in rural develop-
ment co-financed with national funds. In the first 
pillar, i.e. direct payments to farmers, the Commis-
sion wants to reduce expenditure far more moderately. 
Furthermore, it will not use the opportunity to at 
least propose co-financing these direct payments from 
the national budgets of the member states. With 
regard to the increase in expenditure, indications 
came from the European Parliament that the doubl-
ing of funds for the Erasmus programme to promote 
student exchanges, which Commissioner Oettinger 
repeatedly emphasised, would barely be achieved. 
Some commentators14 and members of the Euro-
pean Parliament15 accused the Commission of using 
“budget tricks” and “misleading figures”16 in its pro-
posal. Nevertheless, the Commission insists that its 
reform approach is heading in the right direction. 
In any case, it is undisputed that the share of the 
largest expenditure headings for financing the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy and the European Structural 
Funds in the overall budget is to be further reduced. 
At the same time, the share of other policy areas will 
increase significantly, i.e. expenditure on the com-
mon foreign, security and defence policy as well as on 
migration policy and external border management. 
First Reactions and Positioning 
The Commission has tried to draft a realistic and 
pragmatic proposal and has clearly drawn lessons 
from previous MFF rounds. In 2005, for example, it 
made ambitious but unrealistic proposals, which 
proved unsuccessful in the implementation.17 Obvi-
ously, this time it wanted to determine the negotiat-
ing process of the member states as far and for as long 
as possible, and to earmark the key points for the next 
MFF 2021–2027. This search for a pragmatic pro-
 
14 Zsolt Darvas and Nicolas Moës, “How Large Is the Pro-
posed Decline in EU Agricultural and Cohesion Spending?”, 
Bruegel (Blog), 4 May 2018, http://bruegel.org/2018/05/how-
large-is-the-proposed-decline-in-eu-agricultural-and-cohesion-
spending/. 
15 Alina Dobreva, Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–
2027: Commission Proposal. Initial Comparison with the Current 
MFF, European Parlament Briefing (Strasbourg and Brussels, 
May 2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ 
BRIE/2018/621864/EPRS_BRI(2018)621864_EN.pdf. 
16 “EU-Parlament wirft Kommission Haushaltstricks vor. 
Haushaltskommissar Oettinger korrigiert Zahlen für den 
Finanzrahmen 2021 bis 2027” (EU Parliament Accuses Com-
mission of Budgetary Trickery. Budget Commissioner Oet-
tinger Corrects Figures for the Financial Framework 2021 to 
2027), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 May 2018. 
17 See Peter Becker, “Fortschreibung des Status quo – 
Die EU und ihr neuer Finanzrahmen”, Integration 29, no. 2 
(2006): 106–21. 
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posal with a tentative claim to reform makes the 
Commission’s package vulnerable to attack from 
many different angles. The assessment of the Com-
mission’s proposals by the governments of member 
states and by academic analysis can at best be 
described as cautious. 
The member states positioned 
themselves early on along familiar 
lines of conflict. 
Most member states had already formulated pre-
liminary positions before the Commission published 
its proposal. On 25 January 2018, after long and dif-
ficult internal consultations, the German Government 
agreed on a paper18 in which it generally advocated 
a modernisation of the EU budget and called on the 
Commission to present an ambitious proposal. Al-
ready by December 2017, the French government had 
presented its position paper19; many member states 
followed, such as the Visegrád group, Austria and the 
Netherlands20 in February 2018. While the southern 
and eastern European member states pleaded to con-
tinue agricultural and cohesion policy at the same 
level and increase the overall budget, the net con-
tributors urged limiting and modernising the MFF, i.e. 
changing its spending priorities. However, this time 
before the start of the negotiations, the net contribu-
tors had not quantified and tabled an upper limit for 
the MFF, unlike in the run-up to the previous MFF 
negotiations. 
The European Parliament had similarly positioned 
itself before the Commission presented its legislative 
package. In a resolution adopted by a broad majority21 
 
18 Positionen der Bundesregierung zum Mehrjährigen Finanz-
rahmen der EU (MFR) post-2020 (Berlin, 25 January 2018), 
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2007894/4a6c510f 
226926e7217da2eeb9765c2b/180125-positionen-bureg-mfr-
data.pdf 
19 Notes des autorités françaises, Perspectives et attentes françaises 
pour le prochain cadre financier pluriannuel de l’Union européenne 
(Paris, December 2017), https://www.terre-net.fr/ulf/data/001-
arno/180110-notegouvernementsurbudgetUE2020-2027.PDF. 
20 Dutch Position Paper on New MFF (February 2018), https:// 
www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/vergaderstukken/2018/03/ 
02/dutch-position-paper-on-new-mff-february-2018-engelstalig. 
21 European Parliament, The Next MFF: Preparing the Parlia-
ment’s Position on the MFF post-2020. European Parliament Reso-
lution of 14 March 2018 on the Next MFF: Preparing the Parlia-
ment’s Position on the MFF post-2020 (2017/2052(INI)) (Strasbourg, 
14 March 2018). 
on 14 March 2018, parliamentarians called on the 
Commission to significantly increase the overall 
volume of the EU budget. Too little funding in the 
budget would lead to cuts in agricultural, structural 
and cohesion policy. This should be avoided. Never-
theless, the EU should be provided with additional 
funds in order to be able to cope adequately with new 
challenges and future tasks. The additional money 
should be used for programmes and measures with 
European added value, especially for youth and 
training, the promotion of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, and for research and innovation. In a 
further resolution22 on 30 May 2018, the Parliament 
reacted to the Commission’s proposals and expressed 
its disappointment with what it saw as too low ap-
proaches, particularly in CAP and Structural and 
Cohesion Funds. These two “most important policy 
areas of the EU” should, in the opinion of the Parlia-
ment, be continued with at least the same financial 
envelopes as before. On the other hand, it welcomed 
the proposals on new own resources and linked its 
approval of MFF expenditure to a corresponding 
reform of the Own Resources system. 
Academic observers and think tanks were predom-
inantly sceptical in their analyses and assessments. 
Above all, they criticised the discrepancy between a 
necessary comprehensive reform of the EU budget, 
its structures and objectives on the one hand, and 
the Commission’s pragmatic proposal on the other. 
The central accusation was that this proposal did not 
do justice at all to the reform requirements and was 
merely an expression of the search for a balance 
between conflicting interests.23 The criticism was that 
 
22 European Parliament, 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial 
Framework and Own Resources. European Parliament Resolution of 
30 May 2018 on the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework 
and Own Resources (2018/2714(RSP)) (Strasbourg, 30 May 2018). 
23 Annika Hedberg, The Next EU Budget: Firmly Rooted in the 
Past?, EPC Commentary (Brussels: European Policy Centre 
[EPC], 7 May 2018); Jorge Núñez Ferrer and Daniel Gros, The 
Multiannual Financial Framework, Where Continuity Is the Radical 
Response, CEPS Commentary (Brussels: Centre for European 
Policy Studies [CEPS], 4 May 2018); László Andor, “A Budget 
without Lessons Learned”, International Politics and Society, 6 
June 2018; Iain Begg, Plus ça change … the Commission’s Budget 
Proposal for 2021–27, ETUI Policy Brief no. 9/2018 (Brussels: 
European Trade Union Institute [ETUI], June 2018); Jörg 
Haas, Eulalia Rubio and Pola Schneemelcher, The MFF Pro-
posal: What’s New, What’s Old, What’s Next?, Policy Brief (Paris 
and Berlin: Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, 21 May 
2018). 
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although the European Commission had underlined 
the need to create European added value in its MFF 
proposal, it was clearly lagging behind expectations 
and what was necessary.24 It lacked the political will 
for reform; the interests of defenders of the status quo 
were overpowering.25 
 
24 On the European added value see Daniel Tarschys, The 
Enigma of European Added Value. Setting Priorities for the European 
Union, SIEPS Report no. 4/2005 (Stockholm: Swedish Institute 
for European Policy Studies [SIEPS], June 2005); Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, The European Added Value of EU Spending: Can the EU 
Help Its member states to Save Money? (Gütersloh, 2013); Eulalia 
Rubio, The “Added Value” in EU Budgetary Debates: One Concept, 
Four Meanings, Policy Brief no. 28 (Paris: Notre Europe, June 
2011); Peter Becker, “The European Budget and the Principles 
of Solidarity and Added Value”, The International Spectator 47, 
no. 3 (2012): 116–29. 
25 Friedrich Heinemann, “Mehrjähriger Finanzrahmen: 
Die schwierige Transformation in Richtung europäischer 
Mehrwert”, ifo-Schnelldienst, no. 12 (2018): 3–7. 
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The current European budgetary policy and the grown 
budgetary system are also characterised by the fact 
that the negotiation process for a multiannual finan-
cial framework follows an informal, but nevertheless 
well-established course. The negotiation phases and 
drama are predictable, and the allocation of roles is 
hardly questioned any more. 
This routine and the proven working structures 
mean that it is already clear in advance at which 
point the actors will be dealing with each issue po-
litically, i.e. when the process will be politicised. 
The culmination of politicisation and thus also of 
the visibility of the process is usually reached when 
consensus is sought in the European Council. Here, 
political compromises are made in the form of 
package deals and based on the principle of give and 
take (do ut des), i.e. by tying many individual issues 
together to form a large negotiating package. 
State and Course of Negotiations 
After the Commission had presented its MFF package 
on 2 May 2018 and subsequently the various sector 
directives for expenditure policies, the Council cre-
ated the tried and tested working structures in which 
the MFF negotiations take place.26 In line with the 
procedure during the previous MFF negotiations, and 
also in order to comply with the primary legal re-
 
26 Initially, the Bulgarian Presidency set up an ad hoc 
working group on the Multiannual Financial Framework at 
the General Affairs Council, which was the lead negotiating 
body. In consultation with its Trio Presidency partners 
Austria and Romania, the Presidency drew up a programme 
on the approach of this working group. Furthermore, the 
Council Working Party on Own Resources examined, dis-
cussed and negotiated the proposals for reform of the Own 
Resources system, and the various specialised working 
groups examined, discussed and negotiated the proposals 
for new sector-specific legal acts. 
quirements for the involvement of the European Par-
liament pursuant to Article 312(5) TFEU, the EP rep-
resentatives have since been informed about the 
progress of the MFF negotiations in the Council before 
and after each session of the General Affairs Council 
(GAC). As usual, the Commission first presented its 
proposals, which were then examined by the member 
states, who also asked for explanations and details. In 
its final report27 on interim information for the Euro-
pean Council meeting on 28 June 2018, the Bulgarian 
Presidency listed only a few points of consensus but 
many points of disagreement at the end of its term. 
In the second half of 2018, the 
Austrian Presidency greatly 
accelerated the MFF negotiations 
in the Council. 
In the second half of 2018, the subsequent Austrian 
Presidency intensified activities at the working level 
and continued negotiations in the working groups 
without a long summer break. After this short phase, 
during which the general examination continued, 
the Presidency already in September began its work 
on the “negotiating box”, i.e. the draft of an overall 
political compromise for the next MFF in the form of 
conclusions of the European Council. The Austrian 
Presidency thus greatly speeded up negotiations and 
abandoned the general examination of the Commis-
sion’s proposals in order to begin concrete negotia-
tions on a compromise package sooner than had pre-
viously been the case. The first draft of a negotiating 
box was sent to the member states on 30 November 
2018 and discussed at political level in the GAC on 
 
27 Council of the European Union, Multiannual Financial 
Framework (2021–2027) – Report on the Progress of Work within 
the Council in the First Semester 2018, Doc. 10171/18 (Brussels, 
21 June 2018). 
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11 December 2018.28 This first box already contained 
all horizontal topics and substantive priorities that 
will also be included in the conclusions of the Euro-
pean Council at the end of the MFF negotiations. 
However, the financial estimates for the total volume 
of the future MFF, the distribution among the indi-
vidual expenditure areas, the criteria and indicators 
for the distribution of the Structural Funds among 
the member states and their regions, and decisions on 
the fundamental reform of the Own Resources system 
were still absent. 
The different, sometimes conflicting positions of 
the member states were inevitable and included in 
this negotiating box as bracketed formulations. Under 
Romanian and Finnish Council-Presidency in 2019 
the member states will have to find common solu-
tions for these more than 100 formulations. The 
second negotiating box, presented by the Romanian 
Presidency at the end of its term was not successful in 
bringing the conflicting positions closer together and 
dissolving some of these brackets. The Finnish Presi-
dency announced a continuation of the negotiations 
with bilateral talks with each member state, and then 
tabling in September a new negotiating box which 
shall include maximum and minimum figures for 
all spending policies. If the number of contentious 
points is reduced to only a few fundamental points, 
the heads of state and government in the European 
Council will have to agree on compromise formula-
tions for the final issues and specific figures for MFF. 
Only then will the newly elected European Parlia-
ment be formally involved in the MFF negotiations on 
the member states’ compromise solution. Just before 
the elections the EP has renewed its call for a signifi-
cantly higher volume.29 The members of Parliament 
continued to reject the cuts in the Structural Funds 
and the CAP proposed by the Commission. In its in-
terim report of 14 November 2018, the EP demanded 
a total volume of around €1.363 trillion, equivalent 
to 1.34 percent of the GNI of EU-27. The EP also sub-
stantiated its demands with specific financial ap-
proaches for each individual funding programme. 
On the revenue side, Parliament wants new sources 
 
28 Council of the European Union, Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 – Progress Report, Doc. 14346/18 
(Brussels, 30 November 2018). 
29 It wants the budget to be 1.3 percent of EU GNI or 
€1.324 trillion for commitments, or 1.27 percent of EU GNI 
or €1.294 trillion for payments (at fixed prices in 2018). In 
addition, it would provide €38.6 billion for flexibility instru-
ments outside the MFF ceilings. 
of own resources to be introduced and all rebates and 
correction mechanisms to be abolished. It sees the MFF 
as an overall package consisting of expenditure and rev-
enue, elements of which cannot be adopted separately. 
The EP therefore insists that there will be no agree-
ment on a new MFF “without corresponding progress 
being made on the Union’s new Own Resources”.30 
Already in 2018, the European Council (EC) held 
initial discussions on the future multiannual finan-
cial framework, but without entering into an in-depth 
debate on the Commission’s ideas. It became clear 
early on that it was not realistic to conclude negotia-
tions before the EP elections as requested by the par-
liament and the Commission.31 Already in the so-
called Leaders’ Agenda of the European Council of Oc-
tober 2017, Council President Donald Tusk declared 
that he was striving for an agreement only after the 
EP elections. The European Council in June 2019 de-
cided to “hold an exchange of views in October 2019, 
aiming for an agreement before the end of the year”.32 
Group Formations of Member States 
The real benchmark for a member state’s positioning 
is still its national net balance. Thus, the net contribu-
tors Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands are opposed 
to any increase in the MFF volume, while the net re-
cipients are in favour of a significantly larger finan-
cial volume for the next MFF. These positions have 
been specified in the initial reactions of the member 
states to the Commission’s proposals and in the course 
of negotiations to date. Accordingly, the 27 member 
states can be roughly divided into three groups: 
The Group of Status Quo Preservers 
This group comprises the former net recipients from 
Southern and Eastern Europe and now also Italy. 
From their perspective, the proposed cuts in structural 
and agricultural funds are unacceptable. They call for 
agricultural and cohesion policy to be maintained at 
the same financial level and for the budget to be in-
 
30 European Parliament, Interim Report on the Multiannual 
Financial Framework 2021–2027 – Parliament’s position with a 
view to an agreement, Resolution of 14. November 2018, P8_TA-
PROV(2018)0000449 (Strasbourg, 14 November 2018), here 
paragraph 11. 
31 Peter Ludlow, “February: Institutional Issues, the MFF, 
Martin Selmayr”, European Council Briefing Note 2018/1. 
32 European Council Meeting 20 June 2019, Conclusions, EUCO 
9/19, paragraph 2. 
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creased accordingly. The Commission’s approach of 
increasing the budget volume only slightly would not 
be sufficient to prepare the EU for the challenges 
ahead and at the same time continue the successful 
traditional spending policies to the same extent. Con-
sequently, the MFF ceilings should be significantly 
increased. Some states in this group, such as Hungary 
and Poland, were prepared in principle to make 
higher national contributions. 
The Group of Moderate Modernisers 
Alongside Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Finland and Ireland were in favour of modernising 
traditional expenditure policies and own resources. 
In a joint statement, the two German Ministers re-
sponsible, Olaf Scholz and Heiko Maas, advocated a 
fundamental modernisation of the EU budget immedi-
ately after the presentation of the MFF package by the 
Commission on 2 May 2018.33 Spending policies, such 
as migration and the protection of external borders, 
must be focused even more consistently at European 
added value. The German Government reaffirmed its 
fundamental willingness to make higher contribu-
tions, although a fair burden-sharing between all 
member states was necessary. 
France belongs to the moderate modernisers, 
although it rejects any cuts in the Common Agricul-
tural Policy.34 For the French government it is out of 
the question that support for French farmers would 
be reduced by up to 20 percent according to the Com-
mission’s proposal. France is in favour of increasing 
the MFF under certain conditions, including the im-
mediate abolition of all rebates and the introduction 
of a new source of own resources in the form of a 
digital tax. These requirements on the revenue side 
are complemented by the French government’s strong 
commitment to additional instruments to stabilise 
the euro zone. The French negotiating leadership thus 
combines demands for fundamental reforms and 
innovations with an unchanged level of traditional 
support for its own farmers. So far, Paris has avoided 
making a final and unambiguous decision on whether 
to promote traditional or new policies. A similar am-
 
33 BMF, Gemeinsame Erklärung von Olaf Scholz und Heiko Maas 
zum Kommissionsvorschlag für den Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen 
(Berlin and Bonn, 2 May 2018), https://www.bundesfinanz 
ministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Europa/
EU_auf_einen_Blick/EU_Haushalt/2018-05-02-Gemeinsame-
Erklaerung-Scholz-Maas.html. 
34 Finland and Ireland have similar positions. 
bivalence characterises the German Government’s 
position. But the willingness to increase the German 
contributions to the EU for the sake of a compromise 
solution seems to indicate that Berlin would rather 
increase the total MFF volume. 
The Group of Rigid Savers 
A group of net contributors consisting of Sweden, 
Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands clearly differs 
in their attitude from the somewhat ambivalent and 
relatively moderate position of modernisers. From the 
point of view of this group, the Commission is acting 
too hesitantly. The proposed savings in the CAP and 
Structural Funds are at best a minimum and should 
indeed be much higher, otherwise the necessary new 
policies could not be adequately financed. Sweden 
and the Netherlands, for example, after an initial ex-
amination of the Commission’s proposal, calculated 
that it would result in up to 40 percent higher con-
tributions for the two countries. The Netherlands 
could not accept this, its Prime Minister Mark Rutte 
said. The group argues that with one less member 
state, the EU should get by on a reduced budget. 
These states continue to insist on limiting the budget 
to one percent of EU-27 GNI. 
The categories “net contributors” 
and “net beneficiaries” are 
slowly disappearing. 
There are not only divergences between these 
groups, there are also signs of contradictions and 
contrasts within the groups. For example, the German 
government is sceptical about new sources of own 
resources and insists that the financial burden should 
be distributed fairly. The French demand to abolish 
discounts immediately and completely, in turn, stands 
in clear contradiction of the German position. The atti-
tudes of other member states are not always coherent 
either. It is true that the Baltic states are calling for 
spending priorities to be shifted in future to the pro-
motion of research, innovation and trans-European 
networks. At the same time, however, they reject cuts 
in structural and agricultural funds as well as a clear 
increase in the total MFF volume.35 
The MFF negotiations are therefore facing a diffi-
cult situation which will have an impact on the fa-
miliar drama and the eventual course of the negotia-
 
35 See the letter of 15 February 2018 from the three heads 
of government from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
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tions. Although the negotiation process was quickly 
integrated into the familiar structures and the usual 
distribution of roles, and conflicts between net con-
tributors and net recipients were already apparent at 
the beginning of the negotiations on the MFF 2021–
2027. However, a number of new developments make 
their course more difficult to predict and the posi-
tioning of the groups and actors less predictable. As 
a consequence, uncertainty is growing among all 
actors, which in turn influences their behaviour and 
negotiating tactics. 
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In addition to well-known problems such as climate 
change, sustainability and migration, the European 
Commission lists global political instability and new 
security threats as requirements for the future MFF.36 
However, the most serious change for the European 
budget is the imminent departure of the United King-
dom from the European Union. 
The UK’s Withdrawal from the EU and the 
Consequences for the MFF Negotiations 
When the UK, the EU’s second largest economy to 
date, leaves the Union, the GNI of the Union will 
shrink by around 15 percent. Moreover, the UK has 
always been the second or third largest net contribu-
tor to the EU budget in recent years. Brexit will there-
fore have an impact on the EU budget, both on the 
revenue side and on the expenditure side. 
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU will inevitably 
create a financial hole in the EU budget. The Com-
mission puts it at around 13 to 14 billion euros a 
year,37 without specifying how it calculated this fig-
ure. The UK’s national payments to the EU budget – 
i.e. payments for VAT and GNI-based own resources, 
excluding traditional own resources – have always 
exceeded €10 billion per year since 2010. Yet since 
2010, around €6 billion flowed back annually into 
the UK from the EU budget. Thus, when the British 
net balance is considered, i.e. the British payments 
less EU spending in the UK, the Brexit gap appears 
smaller. Since 2010, despite the special rebate, UK 
net payments have always exceeded the 5 billion euro 
mark; the European Commission’s latest financial 
 
36 European Commission, A Modern Budget for a Union That 
Protects, Empowers and Defends (see note 2), 1. 
37 According to Oettinger, “EU-Budget mit Europäischem 
Mehrwert” (see note 7). 
report38 shows the UK’s operational budget balance39 
for 2016 at around €5.6 billion. The final size of 
the gap will depend to a large extent on the form of 
Brexit, specifically on the terms of the exit and future 
relations between the EU-27 and the UK. 
The form of Brexit will determine the 
extent of the Brexit gap. 
In the course of the withdrawal negotiations, 
EU-27 and the UK have agreed on an arrangement. 
This withdrawal agreement40 of December 2017 pro-
vides for the continuation of the EU financial frame-
work until the end of 2020 without changes or adjust-
ments. The UK will continue to make its contributions 
and payments to the EU budget as if it were still a 
member state of the EU. In return, EU programmes 
will continue in the UK. This means that British 
farmers and fishermen, the regions and universities 
that are supported will continue to benefit from Euro-
pean funding. 
The British rebate is also to apply to the two annual 
budgets for 2019 and 2020. Part of the agreement are 
arrangements to refund the British share of the capi-
tal of the European Central Bank and the European 
Investment Bank, as well as unbundling and partial 
forward projection of its shares in other EU funds and 
instruments outside the EU budget. A solution has 
 
38 European Commission, EU Budget 2017. Financial Report 
(Luxembourg, 2018). 
39 The European Commission has developed a calculation 
method called “operational budget balances” which does 
not take account of administrative costs and traditional own 
resources in the balance calculation. 
40 European Commission, Joint Report from the Negotiators 
of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on Pro-
gress during Phase 1 of Negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the 
United Kingdom’s Orderly Withdrawal from the European Union, 
TF50 (2017) 19 – Commission to EU 27 (Brussels, 8 December 
2017), 9ff. 
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also been found for payment obligations that con-
tinue after the withdrawal (so-called Reste à liquider, 
RAL). This applies, for example, to funding pro-
grammes, agencies or other EU instruments as well as 
pensions for EU civil servants to be paid well after the 
withdrawal. The EU is to send annual reports on these 
commitments to the British government, starting in 
2022. The UK has agreed to subsequently pay the out-
standing amounts.41 
Until the end of the term of the current MFF, the 
UK should therefore remain at least a de facto budg-
etary member, with all rights and obligations. And 
even far beyond that, the country is to pay its obli-
gations from the time of its EU membership on a pro-
rata basis. However, the exact level of British pay-
ments has not been included in the text of the Treaty.42 
 
41 It was also agreed that all British payments would be 
settled in euros, so that changes in the exchange rate would 
not be a problem for the EU. 
42 Various calculations were already made in the run-up to 
the withdrawal negotiations on the level of UK withdrawal 
payments, ranging from €15 billion to an extreme scenario 
of €109 billion. See Alex Barker, The €60 Billion Brexit Bill. How 
to Disentangle Britain from the EU Budget (London et al.: Centre 
for European Reform, February 2017); Iain Begg, “The Brexit 
Divorce Bill”, The UK in a Changing Europe, 20 February 2017; 
Ewa Chomicz, EU Budget Post-Brexit. Confronting Reality, Ex-
ploring Viable Solutions, EPC Discussion Paper (Brussels: EPC, 
7 March 2017); Zsolt Darvas et al., Divorce Settlement or Leaving 
the Club? A Breakdown of the Brexit Bill, Working Paper no. 3/ 
2017 (Brussels: Bruegel, 30 March 2017); Jörg Haas and 
Eulalia Rubio, Brexit und der EU-Haushalt: Gefahr oder Chance?, 
Policy Paper no. 183 (Berlin: Notre Europe – Jacques Delors 
Institute, 16 January 2017); Jorge Núñez Ferrer and David 
Rinaldi, The Impact of Brexit on the EU Budget: A Non-catastrophic 
Event, CEPS Policy Brief no. 347 (Brussels: CEPS, 7 September 
2016). 
The British government calculated the amount at 35-
39 billion pounds, or €40-45 billion, according to the 
then British Prime Minister Theresa May in a question 
time on Brexit in the House of Commons on 11 De-
cember 2017.43 However, as the payments extend far 
into the future, it is not possible to precisely deter-
mine the British contributions. According to calcu-
lations by the UK Treasury, this sum would consist 
of the amounts for the 2019 and 2020 financial years, 
the UK’s share of the fulfilment of outstanding com-
mitments and long-term outstanding payments, for 
example for pensions (see Table 3). 
In addition to these payments, which settle the UK’s 
EU membership obligations, additional UK financial 
contributions could be set in the negotiations on 
future UK-EU relations. The UK government44 has al-
ways indicated its intention to participate in selected 
programmes (such as EU research funding) and EU 
agencies after Brexit.45 It is therefore undisputed that 
the UK would have to provide funding for such par-
 
43 “Brexit Negotiations”, House of Commons Hansard, 
vol. 633 (11 December 2017), https://hansard.parliament.uk/ 
Commons/2017-12-11/debates/965E3010-41F6-4353-A2CC-
2F5A6C31495F/BrexitNegotiations#contribution-FED59209-
BBC6-45DD-AB71-F34C658398CC. 
44 HM Government, The United Kingdom’s Exit from and New 
Partnership with the European Union, Cm 9417 (London, Feb-
ruary 2017), 49, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/589191/The_United_ 
Kingdoms_exit_from_and_partnership_with_the_EU_Web.pdf. 
45 In her Lancaster House speech on 17 January 2017, 
British Prime Minister Theresa May had already signalled 
Britain’s willingness to do so. “The Government’s Negotiating 
Objectives for Exiting the EU: PM Speech”, GOV.UK, 17 January 
2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-govern 
ments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech 
Table 2 
Net Balance of the United Kingdom 2014–2017 
  2014 
mill. € % GNI 
 2015 
mill. € % GNI 
 2016 
mill. € % GNI 
 2017 
mill. € % GNI 
National payments 
(VAT + GNI own resources, rebate)  11,711  0.54  18,193  0.72  12,760  0.55  10,575  0.46 
EU Spending  6,985  0.32  7,458  0.30  7,052  0.30  6,326  0.28 
Operating balance  –5,412  –0.25  –11,703  –0.46  5,585  –0.24  –5,345  –0.23 
Source: European Commission, EU Budget 2017. Financial Report (Luxembourg, 2018). 
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ticipation. The models here are Switzerland and 
Norway, which contribute to the EU’s Structural and 
Cohesion Funds in exchange for full or almost full 
access to the EU’s internal market. The EU could also 
require separate payments for UK participation in 
specific EU programmes or agencies. According to a 
calculation by the House of Lords, a UK budget con-
tribution of €2.7 billion a year could result if the 
same yardstick is used as for Norway.46 
Table 3 
Calculation of UK payments after Brexit 
 Payment period Billion € 
UK participation in 2019 
and 2020 annual budgets 
2019–2020 17–18 
RAL (Reste à liquider) 2021–2026 21–23 
Other payment obligations 2019–2064  2–4 
Total 2019–2064 40–45 
Source: National Audit Office, HM Treasury, Exiting the EU: 
The Financial Settlement (London, 20 April 2018), table 1, p. 5. 
If, however, the UK were to leave the EU without 
an agreement, so that London would then no longer 
pay into the EU budget at all, these calculations would 
be obsolete.47 However, customs duties would then 
apply to the import of goods from Great Britain. These 
customs revenues would flow into the EU budget. 
According to a calculation based on British exports 
to the EU before Brexit worth €255 billion, the EU 
budget would benefit from about €4.6 billion in 
customs revenue per year, if an average 2 percent cus-
toms surcharge on British goods were applied and the 
collection costs, currently 20 percent, were deducted.48 
But whether trade between the EU-27 and the UK 
after Brexit would continue at the same level is ques-
 
46 House of Lords, European Union Committee, Brexit and 
the EU Budget, 15th Report of Session 2016–17, HL Paper 
no. 125 (London, 4 March 2017), 46, https://www.publications. 
parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ ldselect/ ldeucom/125/125.pdf. 
47 In this case, the financing and support programmes 
of the last two financial years 2019 and 2020 of the current 
MFF would also be called into question. The negotiations 
on the budgets for these two years would be burdened with 
additional major uncertainties and fierce distribution con-
flicts in the EU-27. 
48 Ferrer and Rinaldi, The Impact of Brexit on the EU Budget 
(see note 42). 
tionable. At any rate, a decline in trade would also 
reduce the EU’s revenue from customs duties. In any 
case, after Brexit, the EU will have to do without the 
revenue from customs duties levied on imports into 
Great Britain from third countries. After all, from 
2015 to 2018 the UK was responsible for around 25 
percent of the EU’s total customs revenue.49 
The Brexit gap can be closed by 
savings or a larger budget. 
It is very difficult to quantify with any accuracy the 
financial hole in the EU budget caused by Brexit, nor 
the consequences for payments by individual EU-27 
member states, nor for returns to member states. Too 
many factors and unforeseeable developments play a 
role here. 
For the EU-27 negotiations on the next financial 
framework, however, the calculations of future 
British payments to the EU budget and the size of the 
Brexit hole are only of indirect importance. The EU’s 
special Own Resources system for financing its budget 
stipulates that it must always be balanced and that 
the EU may not take on debt. As a matter of principle, 
by setting maximum ceilings for EU expenditure in 
the MFF, the EU’s financial requirements and thus 
also the burdens on the national budgets of the mem-
ber states are settled. The Brexit hole could therefore 
be compensated by savings on the expenditure side, 
or by higher payments by member states on the 
revenue side of the EU budget. 
Some member states have signalled their willing-
ness to pay higher contributions to the EU budget due 
to the departure of the UK. On the other hand, the 
so-called Hanse Group (Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the three Baltic states), 
formed on a Dutch initiative, argued that in a Union 
reduced to 27 members, the budget would also have 
to shrink. In its position paper of February 2018, the 
Dutch government confirmed that “a smaller EU im-
plies a smaller EU budget and, as a consequence, the 
post-2020 MFF will have to be adjusted accordingly.”50 
Other net contributors, such as Sweden and Austria, 
 
49 The UK’s customs revenue was about €4.3 billion or 
24.8 percent of the EU-28’s customs revenue in 2015, about 
€2.9 billion (25 percent) in 2016 and just under €4 billion 
(25.4 percent) in 2017. European Commission, EU Expenditure 
and Revenue 2014–2020, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/ 
interactive/index_de.cfm. 
50 Dutch Position Paper on New MFF (see note 20). 
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joined this position: “When the UK’s contribution is 
phased out and ends, expenditures will have to be 
reduced by the corresponding amount.”51 From the 
point of view of these two member states, the current 
financial framework is adequate and concentrates 
on the right objectives. They consistently call for the 
MFF’s limitation to one percent of EU GNI to be con-
tinued. The Brexit gap initially gives some net contri-
butors leverage for the MFF negotiations to demand 
cuts and shifts within the financial framework. There-
fore, Brexit does not really raise any new questions 
or problems, but only intensifies the already existing 
distribution struggles between net contributors and 
net recipients. 
Yet the UK’s withdrawal will have consequences 
for the distribution of the funding burden. Brexit will 
end the UK’s special budgetary status. This means that 
the special regulations linked to the British rebate 
in favour of other net payers will no longer apply. 
Already when the so-called British rebate was intro-
duced in 1984, Germany was able to enforce a special 
agreement which limited the German share in the 
financing of the correction mechanism in favour of 
the UK. This rebate on the rebate initially amounted 
to one third of the originally calculated German share 
of the compensation mechanism, and was later ex-
tended to the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden. The 
rebates on the rebate must also be supported by the 
other member states, i.e. they must increase their 
payments. As a result of these agreements, since 2002 
France, Italy and Spain have regularly had to con-
tribute easily the largest share to financing the UK’s 
rebate.52 When the British rebate will be abolished, 
the financing burden and net contributions of Ger-
many would therefore also increase significantly, 
because German rebates would cease to apply as well. 
 
51 Government Offices of Sweden, Swedish Position Paper on 
the Future MFF, 1 February 2018. The same position can also 
be found in the Austrian paper, see Mehrjähriger Finanzrahmen 
(MFR) nach 2020 – Österreichisches Positionspapier, 8 February 
2018. 
52 Nicolas-Jean Brehon, The Budgetary Impact of the Brexit on 
the European Union, European Issues no. 454, Policy Paper 
(Paris and Brussels: Fondation Robert Schuman, 5 December 
2017). 
New Reform Projects and 
Negotiation Topics 
The Commission’s MFF proposal not only takes into 
account the consequences of Brexit but also includes 
some new spending priorities. This marks the Com-
mission’s response to changes in the European 
Union’s international environment and economic 
framework. 
The stabilisation of the euro zone 
The debate on introducing instruments to stabilise 
the euro area is a new topic in the negotiations on the 
MFF 2021–2027. In 2012 and 2013, in parallel with 
the negotiation process for the current MFF 2014–
2020, various possibilities were already discussed for 
introducing closer economic policy coordination in 
the euro area and stabilising the single currency. At 
that time, however, the focus was on economic policy 
coordination and convergence rather than on a direct 
link to the EU budget.53 Since then, a multitude of 
different models, forms and functions for an addi-
tional automatic solidarity and stabilisation instru-
ment in the euro zone have been proposed and dis-
cussed in the course of the economic and financial 
crisis.54 French President Emmanuel Macron’s pro-
posal to create a separate budget to stabilise the euro 
zone with new sources of revenue, specific spending 
priorities and its own institutions, became the point 
of reference for the debates, especially in intensive 
Franco-German consultations. 
In its “St. Nicholas-package” on EMU-reform55 of 
6 December 2017, the European Commission had 
already called for the establishment of a separate 
fiscal capacity for the euro zone within the European 
budget and the institutional framework of the Union. 
 
53 Peter Becker, Wirtschaftspolitische Koordinierung in der Euro-
päischen Union. Europäisierung ohne Souveränitätsverlust, SWP-
Studie 19/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
November 2014). 
54 Peter Becker, Die EU auf dem Weg in eine “Transferunion”? 
Ein Beitrag zur Entdramatisierung, SWP-Studie 8/2018 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2018). 
55 European Commission, Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council 
and the European Central Bank. Further Steps towards Completing 
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union: A Roadmap, COM(2017) 
821 final (Brussels, 6 December 2017). 
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In its resolution56 of 14 March 2018, the European Par-
liament also called for the creation of a fiscal capacity 
for the euro zone within the EU budget, followed by 
further expansion and financing with genuine own 
resources. The Parliamentarians referred to the Monti 
Group’s report on the reform of the Own Resources 
system, which had also advocated a fiscal capacity 
with financing from genuine own resources.57 
However, this proposal remained the subject of 
heated debate among the member states. In the run-
up to the euro zone summit on 29 June 2018, the 
Hanse Group had already spoken out against addi-
tional financial instruments or even special budgets 
to stabilise the euro zone.58 Other member states 
that are not part of the euro zone had also explicitly 
rejected a separate budget for the euro zone.59 
A euro zone budget to be agreed as 
part of the MFF in June 2019. 
On the other hand, in their bilateral government 
consultations Germany and France agreed in the 
Meseberg Declaration of 19 June 2018 on the proposal 
“to draw up a budget for the euro zone starting in 
2021 within the framework of the European Union 
in order to promote competitiveness, rapprochement 
and stabilisation in the euro zone”.60 The intensive 
Franco-German negotiations continued, and in No-
vember 2018 the two finance ministers were able to 
present a joint proposal61 for a euro zone budget. For 
the first time it was clearly formulated that this new 
 
56 European Parliament, The Next MFF: Preparing the Parlia-
ment’s Position on the MFF post-2020. European Parliament Reso-
lution of 14 March 2018, P8_TA-PROV(2018)0075 (Strasbourg, 
14 March 2018), paragraph 11ff. 
57 Future Financing of the EU. Final Report and Recommendations 
of the High Level Group on Own Resources (Brussels, December 
2016), http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/hlgor/library/reports-
communication/hlgor-report_20170104.pdf 
58 Peter Ludlow, “June 28–29: Migration Policy, Security 
and Defence, Economic Policy, Brexit and the Future of the 
Euro”, European Council Briefing Note 2018/4, 41ff. 
59 See, e.g., the position paper of the Romanian govern-
ment: Preparing for the Post 2020 Multiannual Financial Frame-
work (MFF) – Romanian Preliminary Position (Bucharest, Decem-
ber 2017). 
60 Press and Information Office of the Federal Government 
of Germany, Erklärung von Meseberg. Das Versprechen Europas für 
Sicherheit und Wohlstand erneuern (Berlin, 19 June 2018). 
61 Proposal on the Architecture of a Eurozone Budget within the 
Framework of the European Union, German-French Non-Paper 
(16 November 2018). 
instrument should remain limited to the members of 
the euro zone, but should be part of the MFF. In this 
way, the coherence of all EU policies could be guar-
anteed and all 27 member states could be involved in 
decision-making. Further details followed in a Franco-
German non-paper dated 21 February 2019, in which 
Paris and Berlin emphasised the member states’ spe-
cial responsibility to reduce their public debt and 
thus prevent a further economic crisis. At the same 
time, however, the German and French governments 
emphasized that convergence and competitiveness 
in the euro zone must be increased. They therefore 
pleaded for support for national efforts towards struc-
tural reforms and public investment from a “Euro 
zone budgetary instrument as part of the EU budget”.62 
Although this new instrument could remain part of 
the EU legal community and be adopted on a legal 
basis of EU primary law, France and Germany 
demand that only euro zone members should decide 
on the use of the instrument. 
The reactions from other member states to the 
Commission’s proposals and the Franco-German 
initiative have been sceptical to negative from the 
outset. At the euro zone summit in December 2018, 
the Hanse Group with the Dutch government as its 
driving force continued to fight to limit financial 
resources and the scope of the proposed budgetary 
instruments for the euro zone. Finally, in the decla-
ration of the euro zone summit of 14 December 2018, 
it was stated that negotiations on the elements of the 
new budgetary instrument for the euro zone should 
be concluded in June 2019. However, a decision on 
the instrument’s financial envelope is to be taken in 
the framework of the MFF negotiations, which will 
not lead to an agreement until the end of 2019. From 
the Dutch perspective, it was probably crucial that 
the budgetary instrument should be established “as 
part of the EU budget while maintaining coherence 
with other EU policies” and used “for convergence 
and competitiveness for the euro zone” instead of 
for economic policy cushioning and stabilisation. 
“The instrument will be adopted in accordance with 
the legislative procedure laid down in the Treaties on 
the basis of the relevant Commission proposal, which 
 
62 Eurozone Budgetary Instrument – Possible Ways Forward after 
the December 2018 Summit, German-French Non-Paper (21 Feb-
ruary 2019). 
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will be amended if necessary”, said the heads of state 
and government of the euro area.63 
The euro zone Summit thus referred to two legis-
lative proposals presented by the Commission in its 
MFF package of 31 May 2018, namely an investment 
stabilisation function and a reform assistance pro-
gramme. With them, it seeks a balance between the 
conflicting interests and positions that exist on the 
volume, financing, tasks and objectives of the new 
instruments. 
In order to mitigate asymmetric shocks in the euro 
zone, the Commission advocates a limited investment 
stabilisation function.64 This will finance loans to 
secure public investment, and issue limited interest 
rate subsidies to member states particularly affected. 
However, the supported member states would have to 
comply with the fiscal requirements of the Stability 
and Growth Pact as well as the economic policy rec-
ommendations of the European Semester, and pursue 
sound fiscal policies. The upper limit for loans is set 
at €30 billion. The interest subsidy is to be financed 
from national contributions and the so-called seignior-
age profits, i.e. the interest gains of the European 
Central Bank on the issue of euro banknotes. Yet the 
Commission wants to promote an anti-cyclical finan-
cial policy by helping to maintain public investment 
in crisis situations; so this investment aid should not 
be offered unconditionally or as unbound financial 
transfers. The investment stabilisation function should 
be part of the MFF, but should not have to comply 
with its strict upper limits. The Commission therefore 
sees no need to create new institutions for the euro 
zone in order to be able to offer effective instruments 
of macroeconomic stabilisation. In addition, it assures 
the sceptics that this aid instrument will only be used 
on the basis of clearly defined trigger criteria and 
strict entitlement criteria. 
The proposal for a second instrument to stabilise 
the euro zone, the reform aid programme,65 is also 
much more modest and limited in scope than France’s 
 
63 European Council, Meeting of the Euro-Summit on 14 Decem-
ber 2018 – Conclusions (Brussels, 14 December 2018), para-
graph 4. 
64 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on the Establishment of a Euro-
pean Investment Stabilisation Function, COM(2018) 387 final 
(Brussels, 31 May 201). 
65 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on the Establishment of the 
Reform Support Programme, COM(2018) 391 final (Brussels, 
31 May 2018). 
original demands. This incentivising and support pro-
gramme is to be limited to a total volume of €25 bil-
lion and used for national structural reforms in the 
member states. The proposed financial and technical 
assistance is to be linked to the country-specific 
reform recommendations of the European Semester, 
i.e. also be conditional. 
The Commission therefore takes a clear stance on 
the fundamental institutional issues. It advocates new 
but financially limited instruments within the struc-
tures of the EU-27, the MFF and its procedures. In con-
trast to France with its ambitious ideas, the Commis-
sion’s proposals are rather reserved and cautious. 
However, it is clear that these form the basis for fur-
ther negotiations on the equipment and scope of the 
new instruments to be created. 
A New Security and Defence Union 
The instability of the international environment 
and the new security threats in Europe prompted the 
European Commission to propose the establishment 
and expansion of a new European policy area, a Euro-
pean security and defence policy. It thus refers to 
the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017,66 in which 
the heads of state and government of the EU-27 and 
the Presidents of the EU institutions promoted a 
secure and protected Europe and called for “a more 
competitive and integrated defence industry”. 
Already in November 2016, the Commission had 
called in its European Defence Action Plan for in-
creased cooperation in defence policy and investment 
in strategic defence projects “to maximise the output 
and the efficiency of defence spending”.67 It also 
stressed the European added value of joint efforts 
by the member states and an integrated European 
defence market. “In order to build common defence 
capabilities, greater solidarity is needed, including 
through the inclusion of the EU budget,” the Com-
mission said.68 It proposed the creation of a European 
Defence Fund, set up on 7 June 2017. This has two 
legally separate components, one for joint funding of 
research, the other for joint development and acqui-
sition of defence capabilities. In its communication 
 
66 The Rome Declaration. Declaration of the leaders of 27 member 
states and of the European Council, the European Parliament and 
the European Commission (Rome, 25 March 2017). 
67 European Commission, European Defence Action Plan, 
COM(2016) 950 final (Brussels, 30 November 2016), 3. 
68 Ibid. 
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of June 2017, the Commission recommended a “step 
change towards closer defence cooperation in Europe”69 
and to creating new financial instruments under the 
MFF 2021–2027. 
The regulation proposed on 13 June 2018 aims 
to merge the two components into a single defence 
fund, which will also be significantly increased with 
a total volume of €13 billion. The fund will provide 
€4.1 billion for the “research window” and €8.9 bil-
lion for the “capacity window”, i.e. for the develop-
ment and procurement of military equipment as well 
as technologies and products relevant to armaments. 
The Defence Fund is intended to stimulate joint arms 
policy research and development projects, thus pro-
moting the “competitiveness and innovative capacity 
of the technological and industrial base of European 
defence” and thus contributing to the “strategic 
autonomy” of the EU.70 To achieve these goals, the 
fund is also to support defence policy-related arma-
ment projects within the framework of the Perma-
nent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). 
With its proposal, the Commission is attempting 
to expand the approaches to defence and armaments 
policy cooperation within the EU and to consolidate 
its own role in this area. Overall, these initiatives ap-
pear to be the first steps towards the Europeanisation 
and supranationalisation of this policy. However, 
despite large increases, the proposed expenditure is 
still low compared to other MFF spending priorities 
or national defence budgets. 
A New Rule of Law Mechanism 
The Commission’s proposal to create a new rule of 
law mechanism to protect the EU budget caused great 
outrage in some Central and Eastern European mem-
ber states, which had previously benefited from large 
sums of funding from the EU budget.71 By endeavour-
ing to measure the proper use of European funds 
with the yardstick of the rule of law, the Commission 
responded to the pressure, particularly from Western 
 
69 European Commission, Launching the European Defence 
Fund, COM(2017) 295 final (Brussels, 7 June 2017), 17. 
70 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Establishing the European 
Defence Fund, COM(2018) 476 final (Brussels, 13 June 2018). 
71 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of the 
Union’s Budget in Case of Generalised Feficiencies as Regards the 
Rule of Law in the member states, COM(2018) 324 final (Brussels, 
2 May 2018). 
European member states, to introduce a “political 
conditionality” for receiving European funding. In 
its resolution of 14 March 2018, the European Parlia-
ment also called on the Commission “to propose a 
mechanism whereby Member States that do not re-
spect the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) can be subject to financial 
consequences”.72 
Rule of law in the member states is to 
become a precondition for correct 
financial management. 
The Commission is in favour of a restrictive sanc-
tion mechanism, which in principle applies to all 
subsidies from the EU budget. It justifies this by 
stating that compliance with the rule of law and the 
separation of powers, accountable, democratic and 
pluralistic legislation, an independent judiciary and 
the guarantee of legal certainty are basic prerequisites 
for the protection of the EU’s financial interests. If 
these conditions are called into question in a member 
state, the Commission should be able to propose stop-
ping the disbursement of European subsidies. The 
final decision as to whether a country can be deprived 
of funds due to a systematic weakening of the judi-
ciary should then be taken by the Council with re-
verse qualified majority.73 In contrast to the existing 
ex ante conditions in cohesion policy, the new rule 
of law conditionality should be applicable at all 
times, also ex post. This should enable the EU to react 
to political changes in the member states. However, 
sanctions should not be imposed on final recipients 
of European funding, such as Erasmus students, but 
only on government agencies in the EU country that 
does not adhere to the rule of law. In practice, this 
could mean that cohesion policy programmes and 
support from the Structural Funds are primarily af-
fected. Unlike the procedure under Article 7 TEU for 
suspending the rights of a member state, this new 
procedure would make it possible to sanction in-
fringements of constitutional principles much more 
quickly, simply and effectively. 
 
72 European Parliament, The Next MFF: Preparing the Parlia-
ment’s Position on the MFF post-2020 (see note 56), paragraph 
119. 
73 Thereafter, a Council decision is deemed to have been 
adopted unless a qualified majority of the member states 
decide within one month to reject the Commission’s pro-
posals for sanctions. 
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This mechanism seems to have been the result of 
the difficult search to develop a political instrument 
with a high symbolic impact, without too obviously 
applying it to individual member states. Nevertheless, 
the thrust against Poland and Hungary, which are 
also subject to proceedings for serious violations of 
European fundamental values under Article 7 of the 
Lisbon Treaty, cannot be overlooked. That is why the 
choice of the legal basis for this regulation proposal, 
namely Article 322 TFEU adopting the EU’s Financial 
Regulation, is particularly important, since it allows 
budgetary provisions to be amended by qualified 
majority voting in the Council. 
However, this legal basis is highly controversial. In 
an opinion, the Council’s Legal Service points out that 
the Commission’s draft regulation is very close in its 
functional objective to the objectives of the Article 7 
procedure, and less clearly oriented towards the pro-
tection of the EU budget. The proposal did not suffi-
ciently demonstrate to what extent “generalised defi-
ciencies in the rule of law” could jeopardise sound 
financial management and the EU budget. The Legal 
Service therefore recommends that clear and precise 
criteria for establishing generalised deficiencies in the 
rule of law be included in the Regulation, including 
an explanation of how such shortcomings could 
threaten the EU budget. For their part, Poland and 
Hungary are pressing for a different legal basis that 
could guarantee unanimous decision-making by all 
member states and thus their veto. 
In addition to the obvious overlap in content with 
the Article 7 procedure and doubts about the pro-
posed legal basis, criticism has also been levelled at 
the fact that the Commission’s assessment has been 
overemphasised in this procedure.74 It is precisely this 
enhanced role of the Commission that raises funda-
mental questions, since it would make the Commis-
sion the judge of the existing different forms of the 
rule of law in the member states. So far, this task has 
been the responsibility of the European Court of Jus-
tice. Such a mechanism would undoubtedly resolve 
the cumbersome steps of the Article 7 procedure, and 
provide the EU with a more feasible and considerably 
 
74 See European Court of Auditors, “Opinion No 1/2018 
(pursuant to Article 322(1)(a) TFEU) concerning the proposal 
of 2 May 2018 for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s in case 
of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the 
member states”, Official Journal of the European Union C 291/1 
(17 August 2018): 1–7. 
more effective set of sanctions in the event that indi-
vidual member states violate fundamental values and 
the principle of the rule of law. 
For the adoption of a regulation and its practice, 
it will be crucial to first make specific the relatively 
broad and vague criteria from the Commission’s 
draft, against which the violation of the rule of law 
and its consequences for sound financial manage-
ment would be assessed. Otherwise, linking specific 
budgetary issues with the fundamental values of the 
European Union could prove to be an impediment 
or even a stumbling block. The politically symbolic 
effect of the proposal, and the support of mainly 
Western European governments, still seems to out-
weigh its actual applicability for the Commission. 
The Reform of the Own Resources System 
and New Own Resources 
On the revenue side, the Commission’s proposal to 
create additional own resources for the EU is not a 
real innovation. Already during the negotiations on 
the current MFF 2014–2020, the Commission had 
promoted new own resources and worked out con-
crete proposals. The European Parliament also regu-
larly calls for additional own resources to be gener-
ated to finance the EU budget. At Parliament’s 
insistence, the High Level Group on Own Resources 
(HLGOR) was set up in February 2014 under the 
leadership of former EU Commissioner and Italian 
Prime Minister Mario Monti to review the Own 
Resources system. In its final report, the group also 
called for the development of new sources of own 
resources to co-finance the EU budget and provide 
political guidance.75 
The Commission’s proposal to modernise the rev-
enue system, diversify sources of finance with new 
own resources and gradually abolish all rebates and 
special arrangements is not genuinely a new ini-
tiative. However, there is some evidence that the 
alliance of supporters of such reforms is greater this 
time than in previous MFF negotiations. A number 
of administrative proposals are also unusual and at 
first sight seem less significant, but could lead to far-
reaching changes. 
 
75 Future Financing of the EU. Final Report and Recommendations 
of the High Level Group on Own Resources (see note 57). 
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The Deletion of Special Arrangements and Rebates 
With the exit of the UK from the EU, the British 
contribution rebate and, consequently, the special 
arrangements in favour of Germany, Austria, Sweden 
and the Netherlands to finance the British rebate no 
longer apply. This increases the political pressure to 
get rid of all rebates and special regulations. After 
Brexit, it will be much more difficult to justify them 
and legitimise them politically. It is with good reason 
that Commissioner Oettinger often speaks of the Brit-
ish contribution rebate as the “mother of all rebates” 
and of the unique opportunity to now establish a 
transparent and fair financing system. 
However, if all special regulations are abolished, 
this will raise again the question of fair burden-shar-
ing among net payers. Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden are currently benefiting from the reduced 
rate call of 0.15 percent for VAT-based own resources 
to the EU budget instead of 0.3 percent, which applies 
to all other member states.76 In addition, Austria, 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands were able to 
negotiate lump sum deductions on their GNI-based 
contributions at different levels.77 In addition to 
the British rebate, a number of rebates and special 
arrangements have thus emerged in the course of the 
development of the Own Resources system since 1984 
in favour of some member states. These regulations 
were created successively in order to compensate for a 
distribution of the financial burden of the EU budget 
which was understood as unfair in terms of net bal-
ances. If all these rules are deleted, the distribution 
conflict between net contributors and net recipients 
and between large and small net contributors will 
erupt again. It will therefore be important to find a 
new balance. At least some net contributors – the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, but also 
Germany – are pushing for a new solution and com-
promise. 
 
76 “Council Decision of 26 May 2014 on the System of Own 
Resources of the European Union (2014/335/EU, Euratom)”, 
Official Journal of the European Union L168/105 (7 June 2014), 
article 2, paragraph 4. 
77 Ibid, paragraph 5: According to the current Own Re-
sources Decision, Denmark’s annual GNI contributions will 
be reduced by €130 million, the Netherlands’ by €695 mil-
lion and Sweden’s by €185 million. Austria’s annual GNI was 
initially reduced by €30 million in 2014, by €20 million in 
2015 and by €10 million in 2016. 
The Increase of the Own Resources Ceiling 
Of particular importance is the Commission’s pro-
posal to increase the own resources ceiling of the 
new MFF in order to widen the margin for unforeseen 
expenditure between this ceiling and the payment 
obligations included in the MFF. Most recently, the 
ceiling was increased in the early 1990s during the 
negotiations on the second multiannual financial 
framework. Currently, the own resources ceiling for 
payment appropriations is 1.2 percent and for com-
mitment appropriations 1.29 percent of EU GNI; the 
two ceilings are to be increased to 1.29 percent and 
1.35 percent of EU-27 GNI respectively. 
The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union 
will reduce the EU’s GNI by around 15 percent. 
Because the MFF ceilings will be set as a percentage of 
EU GNI, they will automatically decrease in nominal 
terms in the future. The Commission estimates that 
Brexit will reduce the own resources ceiling by around 
16 percent. The margin between the budget estimates 
for EU payment commitments on the expenditure 
side and the ceiling will inevitably shrink if the total 
MFF volume in nominal terms remains roughly at the 
current level, or is even increased by the inclusion of 
the European Development Fund in the MFF and if 
the own resources ceiling remains unchanged at 1.2 
percent of EU GNI. This would noticeably reduce the 
EU’s scope for budgetary flexibility. It could result in 
margins insufficient to cover EU expenditure in crisis 
situations without lengthy adjustment of the own 
resources ceiling. According to the Commission, how-
ever, a certain margin would be needed in order to 
be able to adequately continue with flexibility instru-
ments outside the MFF and to establish new instru-
ments. In the Commission’s view, there must also 
be sufficient financial leeway for those budgetary 
financing instruments that have recently been in-
creasingly used to cover financial liabilities in the 
form of loans and financing facilities. Particularly if 
such new financial instruments were to be used to a 
greater extent to stabilise the euro zone, it would be 
vital that the EU could meet its financial obligations 
“even in times of economic downturns”.78 
The proposed increase in the own resources ceiling 
would not imply that member states would have to 
make additional financial resources available to the 
EU. The overall volume of the MFF will be determined 
in the negotiations that will set the financial en-
 
78 European Commission, A Modern Budget for a Union that 
Protects, Empowers and Defends (see note 2), 28. 
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velope for the EU spending and support programmes. 
However, an increase in the own resources ceiling 
would increase the financial leeway for EU flexibility 
instruments outside the fixed limits of the MFF. This 
would increase the EU’s responsiveness in the event 
of unforeseen challenges arising, or necessary ex-
penditure not included and planned in the MFF. 
The Horizontal Issue of 
Budgetary Flexibility 
Not a completely new topic, but unusual in its 
weighting, is the demand to make European budg-
etary policy much more flexible. In its MFF proposal 
2021–2027, the European Commission calls for a 
more flexible and agile budget: what is needed is 
“increasing flexibility within and between pro-
grammes, strengthening of crisis management tools 
and creating a new ‘Union reserve’ to tackle unfore-
seen events and to respond to emergencies in areas 
such as security and migration”.79 To date, the head-
ings of the MFF and their financial endowment have 
been fixed initially for the entire duration of the 
financial framework and largely independently of 
developments in the political environment. This 
definition of political and fiscal priorities can only be 
changed and adapted to new conditions by consensus 
of all member states and EU institutions. In its reflec-
tion paper on the future of EU finances80 of 28 June 
2017, the Commission had already called for addi-
tional efforts and new elements to gain more budget-
ary flexibility. In its contribution to the informal 
meeting of the European Council on 23 February 
2018, it also stressed the importance and urgency of 
it: “[Flexibility] will be essential to adapting to new 
needs and unstable geopolitical and domestic con-
ditions”.81 The European Parliament also expressed 
this view in its resolution of 14 March 2018 and 
called for flexibility instruments to be strengthened.82 
 
79 Ibid., 4. 
80 European Commission, Reflection Paper on the Future of EU 
Finances, COM(2017) 358 (Brussels, 28 June 2017). 
81 European Commission, A New, Modern Multiannual Finan-
cial Framework for a European Union That Delivers Efficiently on Its 
Priorities Post-2020, COM(2018) 98 final (Brussels, 14 February 
2018), 19. 
82 European Parliament, The Next MFF: Preparing the Parlia-
ment’s Position on the MFF post-2020. European Parliament Reso-
lution of 14 March 2018 (see note 21), paragraph 26ff. 
The intention is to make the MFF 
more flexible with new instruments 
and thus strengthen the EU’s ability 
to respond to crises. 
Attempts to make the EU budget more flexible are 
as old as the MFF itself. Since the financial perspective 
for 1988–1992, also known as the Delors I package, 
various elements of flexibility have been successively 
introduced into the financial framework, such as a 
separate flexibility instrument in 1999 and a Solidar-
ity Fund and revision clauses in 2002. The current 
MFF 2014–2020 also contains instruments “to allow 
the Union to react to specified unforeseen circum-
stances, or to allow the financing of clearly identified 
expenditure which cannot be financed within the 
limits of the ceilings available for one or more head-
ings as laid down in the MFF”.83 These include global 
margins for payments and commitment appropria-
tions, a flexibility instrument providing funding for 
specific expenditure, the emergency aid reserve to 
finance specific humanitarian aid and civilian crisis 
operations in non-EU countries, the Solidarity Fund to 
provide financial assistance following a major disaster 
in a member state and the European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund.84 Some of these instruments, such 
as the Globalisation Fund and the flexibility instru-
ment for specific expenditure are used for special 
expenses which cannot be planned within the ceil-
ings set and are therefore outside the limits of the 
MFF. In addition to these agreed instruments, some 
crisis instruments to stabilise the euro area, such as 
the European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) 
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), have 
been added since 2011. Regional Trust Funds for 
specific foreign policy tasks, such as the Emergency 
Aid Funds for Africa and for the Peace Process in 
Colombia, as well as the Madad Trust Fund for Euro-
pean aid in response to the consequences of the 
Syrian civil war in the region, have also been estab-
 
83 “Council Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1311/2013 of 
2 December 2013 Laying Down the Multiannual Financial 
Framework for the Years 2014–2020“, Official Journal of the 
European Union L 347 (20 December 2013): 884–91 (884). 
84 See Eulalia Rubio, The Next Multiannual Financial Frame-
work (MFF) and Its Flexibility (Brussels: Policy Department for 
Budgetary Affairs, Directorate General for Internal Policies of 
the Union, November 2017); Jorge Núñez Ferrer et al., Study 
on the Potential and Limitations of Reforming the Financing of the EU 
Budget (Brussels, June 2016). 
 New Reform Projects and Negotiation Topics 
 SWP Berlin 
 A New Budget for the EU 
 August 2019 
 29 
lished.85 In addition, there were funds to finance 
measures in the wake of the so-called refugee crisis, 
such as the fund for refugees in Turkey.86 
Especially the experience with the current MFF, its 
low adaptability and the inadequately funded flexibil-
ity margins had made it clear that additional instru-
ments and scope were needed. The flexibility of the 
Union budget had been put to a hard test, the Com-
mission stated.87 In its reflection paper on the future 
of EU finances, the Commission admitted: “This ex-
tended financial architecture has allowed the Union 
to mobilise additional funding but it has also added 
to the complexity of EU finances”.88 
By now, there is broad agreement among the actors 
in the MFF negotiations that more budgetary flexibil-
ity is indispensable. It is the means to achieve it and 
the instruments to be used that are controversial. 
First and foremost, the member states are interested 
in ensuring that the predictability and binding nature 
of the MFF are not undermined or called into ques-
tion. As a rule, they therefore try not to endow the 
instruments with too much money, and also to 
restrict their use by defining the potential areas of 
application in detail. 
The Commission is now proposing changes to the 
structure and composition of the MFF, as well as ad-
ministrative and technical issues relating to expendi-
ture headings and programmes and the financial 
allocation of margins and ceilings. It wants to create 
new instruments as well as expand and redesign 
existing ones. It wants to achieve greater flexibility 
between and within programmes, between headings 
and during the lifetime of the MFF. 
A new feature is the proposed “Union reserve”,89 
which shall be financed from unused commitment 
appropriations below the MFF ceilings. These appro-
 
85 Richard Crowe, “The European Budgetary Galaxy”, Euro-
pean Constitutional Law Review 13, no. 3 (2017): 428–52. 
86 Sergio Carrera et al., Oversight and Management of the EU 
Trust Funds. Democratic Accountability Challenges and Promising 
Practices (Brussels: Policy Department for Budgetary Affairs, 
Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union, May 
2018). 
87 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation 
Laying Down the Multiannual Financial Framework for the Years 
2021 to 2027, COM(2018) 322 final (Brussels, 2 May 2018), 3. 
88 European Commission, Reflection Paper on the Future of EU 
Finances (see note 80), 9. 
89 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation 
Laying Down the Multiannual Financial Framework for the Years 
2021 to 2027 (see note 87), paragraph 12. 
priations are to be carried over to the next financial 
year in order to make maximum use of financial 
margins. “This Reserve is a powerful new tool to 
tackle unforeseen events and to respond to emergen-
cies in areas such as security and migration”, the 
Commission explains its proposal.90 The intention is 
also that the overall margin for payments should be 
extended. In the current MFF 2014–2020, unused 
payment appropriations during the last three years of 
the current MFF period can only be carried over to the 
next financial year to a limited extent. This limit shall 
be removed in the future. 
Separate margins and flexibility instruments out-
side the MFF’s strict ceilings will be increased and 
their use expanded. This applies, for example, to the 
Solidarity Fund, the Emergency Aid Reserve and the 
Flexibility Instrument. In future, it would be made 
easier for the member states to reallocate funds be-
tween support policies and programmes and thus to 
deviate from the MFF appropriations. 
Additional possibilities for adjustment and rede-
ployment can also be found within individual expen-
diture programmes, particularly in the case of the 
European Structural Funds and the second pillar of 
the CAP. Since the number of specific expenditure 
programmes is to be reduced from 58 to 37, and the 
financial volume of the individual programmes will 
increase as a result, the amount of possible deviations 
from the MFF specifications will also increase auto-
matically. 
With broader objectives and funding priorities 
within the programmes, funding policies will in any 
case become more flexible, as this offers the recipi-
ents of European funding greater freedom to define 
specific needs and their own priorities. Thus, the 
eleven thematic objectives of European cohesion 
policy that have been pursued to date will be changed 
to five very basic policy objectives.91 It remains to be 
seen, however, to what extent the Commission will 
actually grant these freedoms in practical implemen-
tation to the regions, an extent that will only become 
 
90 European Commission, A Modern Budget for a Union 
That Protects, Empowers and Defends (see note 2), 26. 
91 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Laying down Common 
Provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the Euro-
pean Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, and the European Mari-
time and Fisheries Fund and Financial Rules for Those and for the 
Asylum and Migration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the 
Border Management and Visa Instrument, COM(2018) 375 final 
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apparent in the planning and preparatory work for 
the next funding period. 
EU funds that have not been spent 
should remain in the Union budget 
and be used for other tasks. 
With these proposals, the Commission aims to 
maximise the resources allocated to the EU by the 
member states during the MFF negotiations. Any 
unused resources will remain in the Union budget 
and can be used for other tasks. At present, these 
funds are returned to the member states or offset 
against their payments to the EU budget. The Com-
mission therefore wants to take the member states at 
their word and be able to use the financial resources 
promised in principle even if the original objective 
of expenditure planning has changed or has been 
abolished. In future, it would be easier to use the 
money for current tasks on the political agenda. With-
in the large expenditure blocks, where the member 
states insist on binding allocation of funds from the 
EU budget at the beginning of the MFF’s term, the 
Commission wants to expand the flexibility in terms 
of content and function in the design of the respec-
tive spending policy. The financial resources of the 
policies and their allocation to the member states are 
to remain unchanged. Funding objectives and prior-
ities, however, could be adjusted, at least to some 
extent, to changing framework conditions and new 
challenges. 
Changes in the Process Flow 
The current MFF negotiations started with the knowl-
edge that in 2019 after the elections to the European 
Parliament, both the internal structures of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the new European Commission 
will have to be established and that the leading posi-
tions of EU institutions will have to be selected and 
named. This congruence of institutional and per-
sonnel intermediate phases has not been the case in 
the previous five negotiation processes on a multi-
annual financial framework.92 The new situation 
 
92 Only during negotiations on the so-called Agenda 
2000 in 1998/99 was there overlap with staff issues. After 
the European Commission and its President Jacques Santer 
resigned on 15 March 1999 on the grounds of allegations of 
corruption against the French Commissioner Édith Cresson, 
could cause some delay in the negotiations on the 
MFF 2021–2027, since it may take some time until 
all structures are adapted and all personnel decisions 
within the institutions are made. 
Erosion of Groups and 
New Negotiation Structures 
Also new for the negotiations in the Council is the 
fact that the clear grouping and classification of mem-
ber states into net contributors and net recipients 
seems to have softened. The group of member states 
that do not belong to either category is growing. This 
“neutral” group includes old net-paying member 
states such as Belgium and Luxembourg, but also 
countries such as the Czech Republic and Spain, 
which could become net-contributors in the course 
of negotiations, and depending on economic develop-
ments. 
Furthermore, new groups are emerging which, 
depending on the negotiating aspect, cannot be 
clearly assigned to net contributors or net recipients. 
The so-called Hanse Group, which has come together 
primarily against the Franco-German considerations 
on a separate euro zone budget, comprises both long-
standing net contributors, such as the Netherlands 
and Sweden, and net recipients, such as the Baltic 
States. This group includes members of the euro area 
as well as non-members such as Sweden and Den-
mark. 
As the coherence of the negotiating 
groups dwindles, uncertainty grows. 
The dissolution of the fixed group membership 
could have the consequence that the often practiced 
and well-trodden negotiation paths and processes 
open up. This somewhat unclear and confusing 
tableau leads to increasing uncertainty for all in-
volved. As a result of the decreasing congruence of 
interests, the coherence of the groups seems to be 
dwindling and at the same time so does their nego-
tiating power. In any case, prior to these MFF negotia-
tions, the net contributors group did not write a joint 
letter to the European Commission in which they 
 
a successor for Santer was sought in parallel with the budget 
negotiations. The European Council in Berlin on 24/25 
March 1999 then agreed on Romano Prodi as the new Presi-
dent of the Commission and on Agenda 2000, the financial 
framework for the years 2000–2006. 
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could have pointed out their objectives and demands 
at an early stage. This had been the case in the run-up 
to the last two multiannual financial frameworks.93 
The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the 
EU will also have consequences for the strength and 
conduct of negotiations of the net contributor group. 
In the European budget negotiations, the UK has tra-
ditionally positioned itself as an advocate of a mod-
ernisation of the budget, i.e. greater EU support for 
research and innovation policies. At the same time, 
London has always argued for significant savings and 
cuts in the traditional categories of expenditure, par-
ticularly in the CAP. During the 2005 and 2011 
rounds of negotiations, the UK took a radical stance. 
In 2005, the UK government would only agree to a 
compromise on the 2007–2013 financial framework 
if a comprehensive review and reform process was 
agreed at the same time, explicitly considering a CAP 
reform. London was even prepared to sacrifice the 
British special rebate for this purpose – the “British 
cheque” in exchange for the “French cheque” in 
agriculture was the British demand at the time. In 
the 2011 round of negotiations on the current MFF 
2014–2020, the then Prime Minister David Cameron 
early on set an upper limit for the total volume of the 
MFF: under no circumstances should it exceed the 
total amount for payment obligations of €960 billion. 
With the help of other net contributors, Cameron was 
also able to enforce this MFF ceiling. 
The other members of the net contributor group 
will now lack precisely these stringent negotiating 
tactics, and British arguments in the budget nego-
tiations. In the past, the hard British positions and 
the preference for reforms and radical savings had 
ensured that in most cases the focus was not on Ger-
man interests as the largest net contributor, but on 
London’s demands. Germany’s negotiation and posi-
tioning, which was predominantly mediatory and 
sought a balance, but nevertheless was determined by 
its own interests, almost automatically developed into 
the center of a compromise solution in the dispute 
between net contributors and net recipients. The lack 
of a stubborn, uncompromising and sometimes 
 
93 In their joint letter of 18 December 2010 to the Presi-
dent of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, the 
five heads of state and government from Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, Finland and the United Kingdom, for exam-
ple, pointed out that they are aiming for an MFF volume of 
1 percent of EU GNI. In the negotiations, they succeeded in 
pushing through this reduction in real terms in the MFF. 
radical British negotiating style will make German 
negotiations in particular more difficult. 
However, solidarity among the “Friends of Cohe-
sion”,94 i.e. the net recipient group, could also erode. 
Some member states in Central and Eastern Europe 
may have to accept major cuts in the financing of 
their Structural Fund programmes if the new eligibil-
ity criteria proposed by the Commission are applied 
to the Structural Funds, in particular the inclusion 
of refugees. Poland and Hungary are expected to lose 
more than 20 percent compared with the previous 
spending period. Initial calculations for the southern 
European recipient countries such as Greece and 
Spain, as well as the new member states Bulgaria, 
Romania and Croatia, suggest, however, that the 
volume of their support programmes will increase 
slightly.95 These different interests within the group 
of net recipients may also cause the coherence of 
the group to crumble, or ensure that more efforts are 
necessary to keep it together. 
New coalitions are emerging, with some mem-
bers changing, and – depending on the negotiating 
topic – a loosening of group ties. These unclear con-
stellations can produce new results, but could also 
make it difficult to reach agreement on them. In any 
case, the negotiating constellation within the circle 
of member states becomes more complex and am-
biguous. 
 
 
94 Like the net contributors, the representatives of the 
countries receiving money from the European Structural 
Funds meet regularly. This group, called “Friends of Cohe-
sion”, includes Poland, Hungary, the Baltic States, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Portugal, 
Greece, Cyprus, Malta and Croatia. In the run-up to the MFF 
2014–2020 negotiations, Poland has taken over the unoffi-
cial leadership of the group from Spain. Like Ireland, which 
received considerable sums from the European Structural 
Funds in the 1980s and 1990s, Spain is no longer taking part 
in the current meetings of the “Friends of Cohesion”. 
95 See Melchior Szczepanik, Central Europe in the Negotia-
tions of the EU Multiannual Financial Framework, PISM-Bulletin 
no. 128 (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych 
[PISM], 19 September 2018). 
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Scenario for the Further Course 
of Negotiations 
With the presentation of the negotiating box in 
November 2018, the Austrian Council Presidency 
significantly accelerated the process and set in place 
the first cornerstones. Further topics or completely 
new positions on the familiar conflict issues will 
barely be possible – and if they are, then only at 
high political cost elsewhere. For the negotiations, 
this means that the existing points of contention must 
now be worked through until an agreement can be 
reached. On the one hand, therefore, the member 
states must define red lines for themselves. On the 
other hand, it is a matter of finding avenues for com-
promise, linking different positions and exploring 
package or compensation solutions. The Romanian 
Presidency of the Council did not have enough ex-
perience or political weight for this diplomatic fine-
tuning. It will be the main task for the Finnish Presi-
dency to table possible solutions and compromises 
and thus prepare the ground for the deliberations in 
the European Council. Finland has already signalled 
that it will present a revised negotiating box with 
initial financial proposals directly after the summer 
break. 
In doing so, the pace of negotiations, combined 
with a sense of good timing for compromise, is an 
important tactical tool. The pressure on the net 
recipients to reach a compromise increases with the 
danger that delays in the negotiations will interrupt 
the flow of subsidies from the EU budget. The final 
negotiations on the MFF 2014–2020 and those on the 
new legal basis for the new funding instruments were 
also concluded only a few days before the end of the 
MFF term. If the current process is similarly sluggish, 
this could mean that negotiations would have to be 
conducted and concluded in 2020 under the Croatian 
and German Council Presidencies. Some countries 
receiving funding from the European Structural 
Funds are speculating that during its presidency, Ger-
many, as the largest net contributor, could be more 
willing to accept additional payments in order to 
avoid a delayed start into the next funding period. 
Central actors in this negotiation phase are the 
Finnish Presidency and the President of the European 
Council. His assessment is decisive for the course and 
conclusion of the negotiations. It is up to him how to 
assess the state of the negotiations and when to put 
the dossier on the European Council’s agenda.96 A 
first discussion in the European Council is planned 
for October 2019, when the Still-President Donald 
Tusk will have to begin to search for paths of agree-
ment for the negotiations between the heads of state 
and government. These will deal with substantive 
political issues, i.e. overall volume, priorities and 
distribution of resources and burdens. However, it is 
questionable whether Tusk will then still have the 
necessary political persuasiveness to achieve a con-
sensus among the heads of state and government. In 
previous years, the heads of state and government 
only agreed on a new financial framework for the EU 
at the second attempt in the European Council. It is 
therefore likely that Tusk’s successor Charles Michel 
will have to make the decisive attempt to reach a con-
sensus in the European Council, in the best case sce-
nario in December 2019 or more likely in February 
2020. 
Uncertainty about the role and possibilities of the 
Council President and about the timetable increases 
the tactical uncertainties in negotiations amongst 
all actors. Thus it remains unclear to member states 
when the decisive agreement attempt will start and 
when they will have to draw their red lines, while at 
the same time avoiding revealing their negotiating 
position too early to the gain of other member states. 
But it is not only this procedural openness that causes 
 
96 This decision could also depend on Tusk’s ambitions to 
return to Polish domestic politics. 
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problems. Previous mechanisms and institutions that 
have so far been able to mediate a consensus have 
become increasingly dysfunctional, such as the clear 
attribution and coherence of the groups among the 
member states. All these factors influence the nego-
tiation scenario and the tactics of member states. The 
remaining anchors of stability are all the more impor-
tant, and expectations on their mediation capabilities 
are rising. 
Germany’s Role in this Scenario 
When the decisive negotiations are conducted at the 
highest political level in the European Council, it will 
be a question of balancing sometimes contradictory 
positions to reach consensus. Then member states 
will also present their special requests in return for 
their willingness to agree to the overall package. This 
list of special requests and extra payments is by now 
an integral part of the discussions in the European 
Council. In the course of the MFF negotiations to date, 
this list has become longer and more expensive. This 
time special payments for Ireland or the Irish border 
regions with Northern Ireland are conceivable to 
cushion the economic impact of Brexit. Southern 
European member states could also receive extra pay-
ments to help them bear the burden of high migratory 
pressures. 
At the latest when the most difficult blockades 
have to be removed by promising additional contri-
butions, all eyes and great expectations will be on 
Berlin. The governing parties have already made it 
clear that the German Government is in principle 
prepared to pay more into the EU budget. Berlin is 
thus abandoning the more restrictive line it took 
at earlier rounds of negotiations. In their coalition 
agreement,97 CDU/CSU and SPD have stipulated that 
the German government should strengthen the EU 
financially. The very fact that the United Kingdom is 
leaving the EU, and thus the tough British position 
will not be part of the negotiations, increases the 
pressure on Germany to allow for a compromise in 
the European Council in the final phase of the MFF 
negotiations. This time, Berlin will no longer be able 
to argue that it must take into account an extreme 
British position. Therefore, savings, redeployments 
 
97 Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutsch-
land. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag 
zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD (Berlin, 7 February 2018), 8. 
and fundamental reforms of the EU budget could 
become more difficult. It is easier for other member 
states to demand that a conflict of interest be resolved 
with additional funds, especially if these are raised by 
third parties. In contrast, reallocations could trigger 
new distribution battles in domestic political arenas. 
It will be important for the German Government to 
negotiate a balanced combination of financial com-
mitments and effective measures to modernise the 
EU budget. It will also be important to find a balance 
between efforts to limit its own burdens and, simul-
taneously, to get the necessary MFF reforms under 
way. While uncertainty in the negotiations among 
member states is growing, expectations about Ger-
many’s ability to solve problems and its willingness 
to compromise as a central member state and engine 
for economic growth are rising. Therefore, the Ger-
man Government should be prepared for its decisive 
role. On the one hand, the openness of the process 
enables the potential for further reforms and mod-
ernisation impulses. On the other hand, it requires 
a willingness to assume greater burdens for such 
reforms. In the emerging negotiation situation, there-
fore, firmness and clarity in defining goals and fun-
damental positions are first and foremost required. 
However, sufficient flexibility and the ability to com-
promise are also needed to resolve the less fundamen-
tal negotiating conflicts. 
Two guidelines should determine German negotia-
tions in this MFF negotiation endgame: 
Unity and cohesion: During the crises of recent years, 
there has been a tendency in the EU budgetary policy 
to create intergovernmental extra budgets and trust 
funds to equip the EU with instruments for a rapid, 
limited and targeted response. This trend should end 
and the number of such emergency instruments be 
reduced to an absolute minimum. The existing spe-
cial budgets should be largely integrated into the 
Union budget and consequently negotiated and 
adopted with the community method. Ideas for new 
instruments – such as a large special budget for the 
euro zone with its own institutions that far exceeds 
the actual EU budget – would contradict the objec-
tive of consolidating unity, consensus and internal 
cohesion of the EU-27. It is undoubtedly more diffi-
cult to agree on how the new euro zone budget 
should be integrated into the MFF. However, it would 
serve the fundamental objective of unity and cohe-
sion of the EU-27 even more. Yet the European Parlia-
ment’s demand to increase the size of the EU budget 
to more than 1.3 percent of EU GNI seems excessive. 
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This would not be appropriate to dispel the reserva-
tions of net contributors against too rapid an increase 
in expenditure and against less efficient and target-
oriented spending policies. The goal of strengthening 
cohesion and unity of the EU as a whole requires a 
minimum of realism and pragmatism from all EU 
actors and institutions. 
Stabilisation and modernisation: The development of 
new European policies can stabilise the EU as a whole 
and in the medium term. This applies, for example, 
to internal and external security, external border pro-
tection and the plan to prepare national economies 
for digitalisation. Such a reform, whereby priorities 
are set anew and instruments of the EU budget policy 
are adapted, can only succeed if the Union’s budget 
is modernised simultaneously. The budget, however, 
can only be reoriented step by step in order to over-
come as far as possible the resistance of those mem-
ber states and interest groups that find themselves 
on the losing side of these reforms. Modernising and 
reorienting the EU budget should strengthen the EU’s 
ability to act and react, and thus also help to stabilise 
the Union as a whole as well as the integration pro-
cess. A pragmatic reform of European budgetary 
policy could demonstrate that the EU is capable of 
responding adequately to a changing political en-
vironment. 
On the basis of these guidelines, policies should be 
selected and specified whereby Germany is prepared 
to throw its political weight into the balance and 
invest financial resources. Here the Europeanisation 
of security and defence policies and external border 
protection would be an appropriate choice. The nego-
tiating tactics of the German Government should 
then be determined by combining its fundamental 
European policy goals and reform interests with the 
net balance perspectives of other member states and 
the demands for new, reform-oriented conditions. 
These tactics would avoid making payment flows 
and net balances a starting point for reforms, but 
rather the content, objectives and functionality of the 
European spending policies. It should be the German 
Government’s overriding concern to cohere the wish 
list of European partners in MFF negotiations with 
steps towards a further deepening of the European 
Union, and to consolidating the existing structures. 
For example, additional European special assistance 
could be granted to alleviate migration pressure if the 
countries concerned agree to Europeanise the protec-
tion of the EU’s external borders and to reform Euro-
pean asylum policy. It would also be conceivable to 
continue the European support policy with the help 
of the Structural and Cohesion Funds if the respective 
member states modernise their national economic 
structures and actually implement necessary struc-
tural reforms. Finally, the new instruments for stabi-
lising the euro zone and offering further risk-sharing 
and additional aid in the event of crises could only be 
agreed if the respective countries more conscientious-
ly abide by the Community stability criteria. 
Abbreviations 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy 
EC European Council 
EDF European Development Fund 
EFSF European Financial Stabilisation Facility 
EMU Economic and Monetary Union 
EP European Parliament 
ESM European Stability Mechanism 
EU European Union 
GAC General Affairs Council configuration 
GNI Gross National Income 
HLGOR High Level Group on Own Resources 
MFF Multiannual Financial Framework (of the EU) 
PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation 
RAL Reste à liquider (outstanding payment obligations) 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UK United Kingdom 
VAT Value added tax 
  
 
 
  
 
